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Who· Says You.'re Disabled? 

The Role of Medical Evidence in the 

ADA Definition ofDisability 

Deirdre M. Smith* 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), enacted by Congress seventeen years ago, 
offered disabledpeople a hope for equality and access thathas not been fi.JJflDed Court decisions 
halt an overwhelming mE!fority ofclaims at the summaryjudgment stage. A key mechanism for 
fencing out disabledpeoples claimsis an improperandpemiciousrequirement basedupon the vezy 
construction of disability that the ADA:S proponents aimed to dispel, that medical evidence is 
requiredas a thresholdmatterto demonstrate that the statute applies. The statedrationales appliedto 
the medical evidence requirement such as the need for corroborating evidence, objective evidence, 
or evidence to assistJunes in assessing disabilities that are not obvious, do not withstand analysis 
under either the substantive Jaw ofthe ADA or broader summaryjudgmentprinciples. Such a 
requirement in fact reflects an unstated rationale: a deep-seated skepticiSJ1? of those claiming 
disabilitygeJJerally andADA plaintiffs specificaUy As aresult fudges disregard theproperanalysis 
to be apph'ed to summary judgment motions and instead impose a hypertechnica4 heightened 
evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in an effort to foreclose potentia.J. malingers' claims :5:om reaching 
the trial stage. The detennination ofwhether aperson is truly disabled ormerely exaggerating her 
condition to achieve some secondazygain through ADA litigation is one moreproperlyleft tojurors 
than to doctors. The continuedl1egemony ofmedicine in identifjing disability. as demonstrated in 
the view that physicians can and should serve as gatekeepers of disability claims, wrongly 
pathologizes and demeans the category ofdisability and undermines the statute:S effectiveness as a 
tool to advance civilrights. 
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I. lNTR()DUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), enacted by 
Congress seventeen years ago, offered disabled people a hope of 
equality and access that has not been fulfilled. 1 Court decisions halt an 
overwhelming majority of claims, particularly in the employment 
context, at the summary judgment stage.2 A key mechanism for 
fencing out disabled people's claims is the pernicious requirement, 
based upon the very construction of disability that the ADA's 
proponents aimed to dispel, that medical evidence is required as a 
threshold matter to demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to seek 
protection under the statute.3 The medical evidence requirement 
embodies and applies a model of disability that pathologizes disabled 
people and undermines the statute's effectiveness as a tool to advance 
civil rights. 
The statedrationales applied to the medical evidence requirement, 
such as the need for "corroborating" evidence, "objective" evidence, or 
evidence to assist juries in assessing disabilities that are not "obvious,':>'\ 
in fact reflect a common unstatedrationale: a deep-seated skepticism 
of those "claiming disability" generally and ADA plaintiffs 
specifically.5 As a result, judges disregard the proper analysis to be 
applied to summary judgment motions and instead impose a 
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified in scattered sections of29, 42,47 U.S.C.). 
2. See iniTa notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Summary judgment is a court 
action that resolves part or all of a claim prior to trial. See FED. R. Crv. R 56. Generally, a 
motion for summary judgment is made after discovery is completed. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322-23 (1986); Galv.inv. Eli Lilly & Co., 488 F.3d 1026, 1030 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007); Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007); Smith 
Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 2007 FED App. 05-6053 (6th Cir.). The 
moving party, most often the defendant, assembles and presents to the court a compilation of 
certain evidence (i.e. affidavits, exhibits, and deposition testimony) and asserts that in light of 
such evidence, there is no genuine issue ofmaterial fact, that no reasonable jury could find in 
favor of the other party, and that the only issue(s) to be resolved are legal, not factual, in 
nature. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-52 (1986). To avoid 
summary judgment, generally the nonmoving party must present admissible evidence to the 
court demonstrating that there is a disputed issue of material fact to be resolved at trial. Id at 
248. 
3. See infTa notes 79-107 and accompanying text. 
4. See infTa notes 96-107 and accompanying text. 
5. See Michael Berube, Foreword· Pressing the Claim to SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING 
DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY, at vii-viii (1998) ("'(C]lairning disability' is sure to 
become one ofthe most politically sensitive endeavors a body can undertake. . . . In the wake 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 'claiming disability' will involve taking up a 
contested place in an intricate socio-legal apparatus ...."); in!Ta notes 174-230 and 
accompanying text. 
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hypertechnical, heightened evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in an effort 
to foreclose potential malingerers' clairJ;ls from reaching the trial 
stage.6 This skepticism, however, is itself another form of entrenched, 
invidious discrimination against people with disabilities, and the 
continued reliance on physicians to identifY "true"· disability 
unreasonably limits the ADA's reach.7 
Moreover, judges' reliance on medical evidence to screen out 
claims . brought by people faking or exaggerating disability is 
misplaced. The determination of whether a person is truly disabled or 
merely exaggerating her condition to achieve some secondary gain 
through ADA litigation is one more properly left to jurors than to 
doctors. Doctors themselves do not profess to be able to ascertain 
disability or malingering or to accurately assess limitations on major 
life ·activities to any degree of accuracy. 8 A plaintiff's testimony is 
sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of disability.9 Whether such 
evidence, standing alone, is ultimately persuasive in proving disability 
is a question for the fact finder. 
This Article argues that many courts improperly require plaintiffs 
to produce expert medical evidence to establish that they meet the 
statute's definition of an individual with a disability. 10 As explained in 
6. See inffa notes 73-107 and accompanying text. 
7. See inffa notes 174-230 and accompanying text. 
8. See inffa notes 231-259 and accompanying text. 
9. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1228 (8th ed: 2004) (defming "prima facie case" 
as "[a] party's production of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue 
and rule in the party's favor"). One possible basis for the entry of summary judgment in 
favor of a defendant is a plaintiff's failure to demonstrate that she could present sufficient 
admissible evidence at trial to establish a prima facie claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 4 77 
U.S. 317,322-23 (1986). The CelotexCourt stated: 
fu our view, the plain language of RUle 56(c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential 
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.· 
fu such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact;' since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essential elerpent of the nonmoving party's 
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a 
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she 
has the burden of proof. · 
Id 
10. The scope of this Article is limited primarily to cases decided under the ADA. 
However, this is not the only antidiscrimination law used to assert the rights of people with 
disabilities. Every state in the country has enacted some form of protection for people with 
disabilities in employment and other contexts. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT POLICY BRIEF SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA-No. 6 
DEFINING "DISABILITY" IN A CIVIL RIGHTS CONTEXT: THE COURTS' FOCUS ON EXTENT OF 
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Part II, the statute andregulations are silent on any such requirement, 
and the agency interpretive guidance on the ADA offers few explicit 
references to the role ofmedical evidence in ADA disability analyses. 
That Part also reviews how disability studies scholars and the ADA's 
proponents aimed to shift the predominant thinking on sources of 
"disability" from individual pathology to externally imposed barriers 
that limit a person's access to all segments of society. Part III's review 
of the approaches taken by court decisions expressly addressing the 
role ofmedical evidence in an ADA plaintiff's prima facie case reveals 
that the strongest trend among the courts is to require such evidence· to 
corroborate a claim of disability. However, the stated rationale for that 
dominant line of c&ses does not withstand analysis under either the 
substantive law of the ADA or broader summary judgment principles, 
as Part N demonstrates. Part V argues. that the unstated rationale of 
such cases reflects a view that physicians can and should serve as 
gatekeepers of such claims to prevent malingerers from getting to trial 
and that . such sentiment wrongly pathologizes ·and demeans the 
category of "disability." Part VI reviews some evidentiary questions 
and implications raised by this examination of the role of medical 
evidence and concludes that the rules of evidence do not preclude 
plaintiffs from testifying as to their own disabilities. Finally, Part VII 
concludes that the C0}1tinued hegemony of medic:irie in identifying 
disability impedes the advancement of civil rights of people with 
disabilities. 11 
LIMITATIONS AS OPPOSED TO FAIR TREATMENT AND. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 12-21 (2003), 
available at http://www.ncdgov/newsroom/publications/pd:f/extentoflimitations.pdf· [hereinafter 
NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF]. Most of these statutes were enacted, in some 
part, in advance of the ADA, and several statutes were modeled to some extent on the 
language ofthe Rehabilitation Act or amended to parallel the ADA. See id. The statutes may 
be more or less restrictive in terms of coverage than the federal antidiscrimination laws. See 
id.; Sande L. Buhai, In Th~ Meantime: State Protection ofDisability Civil Rights, 37 LOY. 
L.A. L. REv. 1065, 1065 (2004) (arguing that "[d]evelopments in the various states ... will 
ultimately make federal civil rights protections more effective"). 
11. There is some debate and disagreement within academic . and activist settings 
regarding the appropriate and, acceptable language to use to describe the group ofpeople the 
statute seeks to protect, such as "people with disabilities" or "disabled people." Both terms 
have their defenders, and I will use both interchangeably throughout this Article, following 
th_e rationale applied by psychologist Joan Ostrove and her coauthor Danette Crawford: 
Many disability rights activists believe that the term "people with disabilities" puts 
the person first without undue focus on their physical (or psychological) condition. 
Other disabled individuals, particularly in the UK, assert that "disabled person" 
should be used to highlight ·the salience of disability oppression. The use of both 
terms is meant to recognize and support both perspectives. 
i 
. II 
~ 
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IT. 	 THE ADA, REGULATIONS, AND MODELS OF DISABILITY 
The starting point for the evaluation of any claim under the ADA 
is the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to protection under 
the statute as an individual with a "disability."12 There is no catalog or 
list ofmedical diagnoses or conditions that constitute "disabilities" for 
purposes of the ADA. Rather, the definition includes the following 
three categories: 
(A) 	 a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more ofthe major life activities ofsuch individual; 
(B) 	 a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.13 
The issue of medical evidence comes into play most clearly in cases 
brought by individuals seeking to establish disability under the first 
category of the ADA's definition, which may be referred to as "actual 
disability" claims. 14 In such cases, one must demonstrate disability in 
two steps: (1) the presence of a physical or mental impairment (2) that 
Joan M. Ostrove & Danette Crawford, "One lady oos so busy staring at me she walkedinto a 
ooll':' Interability Relations fi'om the Perspective ofTlilmen with Disabilities, 26 DISABILITY 
STUD. Q. 3 n.2 (2006). 
12. See42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). For Title I (employment) and Title II (public. 
services) claims, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that she is "qualified," as that term is used 
in each title. See id § 12111(8) (stating that a person is qualified if she can perform the 
essential functions of the position in question, with or without reasonable accommodation); 
id § 12131(2) (stating that a person is qualified if she "meets the essential eligibility 
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided 
by a public entity"). However, the definition of disability in § 12102(2) applies to all ADA 
claims. The ADA's approach is in contrast to that ofTitle VII .of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of certain characteristics (e.g., race; gender, 
national origin, religion). There have been some attempts, all ultimately unsuccessful, to 
amend Title VII to include "handicap" as a protected category. See RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED 
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 132-33 (2001). 
13. 	 § 12102(2). 
14. The focus under the second two categories is the perception, lmowledge, and 
beliefs of the defendant. See id Specifically, under the second prong, "a record of such an 
impairment," the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that a defendant was aware of the 
plaintiff's medical history. See Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 
(11th Cir. 1999). While this necessitates some showing of a history of a sufficiently limiting 
impai.n.D.ent, the focus remains on the defendanfs intent and actions in responses to 
1mowledge ofcertain facts. See id To satisfy the third prong, "being regarded as having such 
an impairment," a plaintiff must show a specific subjective belief on the part ofthe defendant 
that the plaintiff had an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 
See, e.g., Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(stating that it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that his employer was aware of his 
disability but must also show that his employer perceived that disability as substantially 
limiting). 
··-·------~---~~-J 
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substantially limits one or more specifically identified major life 
activities. 15 
The text of the ADA's definition of disability, quoted above, is 
silent on the role of medical evidence in the determination of either or 
both of these two steps for establishing the presence of a qualifying 
disability. The same is true of the regulations promulgated to guide 
implementation and enforcement. 16 However, as discussed in Part lll, 
most federal judges assume, with little discussion or analysis, that 
most or all ADA claimants have the burden of proving that they are 
disabled through. the use of expert medical evidence. 17 Such 
conclusion may derive :from the statute's use of the term impainnent 
and its association with physical or mental pathology, combined with 
the individualized assessment of disability required by the 
implementing regulations and case law. 
A. Models ofDisability and Impainnent . 
. The use of the term "physical or mental impairment" in the 
ADA's definition of disability merits particular examination when 
considering the role of medical evidence in ADA claims. The term is 
derived directly :from the definition of disability found in the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which was the first federal statute to 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability in employment and 
public services. 18 There was little, if any, attention given to the term at 
the time of the enactment of the earlier statute.19 However, disability 
studies theorists and disability activists attach significance to the term 
.impainnent, particularly as it indicates an inextricable · connection 
between medicine and disability . 
. British scholar Michael Oliver, in his 1990 essay The Politics of 
Disablement, was one of the first scholars to analyze the specific 
implications of the terms impainnent and disability.20 The term 
impainnent, these scholars argue, refers solely to a physical (or 
mental) condition, a "description of the physical body."21 Disability, by 
15. § 12102(2)(A). 
16. See29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2007). 
17. See infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text. 
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). The statute's reach, however, is restricted to recipients of 
federal funding. Id § 794(a). 
19. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
20. MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLEGALAI'PROACH 11 
(1990). 
21. Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 621, 700 
(1999) (quoting MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
I 
l 
i 
------------------------·---------------------- _______________I 
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contrast, stems solely from society's reaction to the impairment, in 
terms of physical barriers or discriminatory attitudes.22 Thus, people 
do not have disabilities, they are disabled by others. 
This approach to the concept of disability draws a sharp 
distinction between, on the one hand, what disability scholars have 
dubbed the traditional "medical model" of disability, in which the 
"disability" was something contained within the individual and was the 
subject of diagnosis, treatment, and rehabiljtation, and, on the other 
hand, the "social model" of disability, in which the disability is 
understood as something externally imposed on the individual. 23 In 
creating this dichotomy, disability scholars and activists challenged the 
hegemony of concepts of disability derived from medicine and 
pathology.24 As Simi Linton observed: 
[T]he medicalization of disability casts human variation as deviance 
from the norm, as pathological condition, as deficit, ~d, significantly, 
as an individual burden and personal tragedy. Society, in agreeing to 
assign medical meaning to disability, colludes to keep the issue within 
the purview of the medical establishment, to keep it a personal matter 
and ''treat" the condition and the person with the condition rather than 
35 (1996)); see Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased 
Reasoning?, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 26, 28 
(Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) (discussing the impact of the "traditional model of 
impairments" on the "subordination of disabled individuals"). Inclusion of the adjectives 
"physical or mental" serves to distinguish such impairments from "social" disabilities such as 
poverty, race, gender, and other characteristics. See id at 26-27. 
22. See Lianne C. Knych, Note, Assessing the Application a/McDonnell Douglas to 
Employment Discrimination Claims Brought Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 79 
MINN. L. REv. 1515, 1518-20 (1995) (arguing that society lumps all disabled people into one 
category regardless of their ability and classifies people as either able-bodied or disabled).. 
23. Arlene S. Kanter, The Promise and Challenge ofthe United Nations Convention 
on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSEJ. INT'LL. & COM. 287, 291 (2007) 
(stating that the medical mqdel ofdisability views those with disabilities as "sick and in need 
of a cure," while the social or human rights model of disability places the responsibility on 
society to eliminate the unequal treatment of disabled people). 
24. See, e.g., Martin Sullivan, Suf:!iected Bodies: Paraplegia, Rehabilitation, and the 
Politics ofMovement, in FOUCAULT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF DISABILITY 27-42 (Shelley 
Tremain ed., 2005). Sullivan describes how the use of"medical power" transformed patients 
into "subjects." Id He goes on to note, "The medical judges (the priests and priestesses of 
secular society), having assumed the right to absolve or condemn [through diagnosis and 
other fonns of dividing practices], exercise immense power over people's bodies, their health, 
and their lives." ld at 30; see HARLAN LANE, THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING THE 
DEAF CoMMUNITY 24-26 (1992) (describing the "medicalization" of deafuess from 
"difference into deviance" by medical professionals). 
' 
u 
P----···· 
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"treating" the social processes and policies that constrict disabled 
people's lives.25 
A second alternative to the medical model is the minority group 
model,26 also referred to as the civil rights model,27 which is distinct 
from the social model in its focus on the notion that there is (or should 
be) a core set of rights to be free from discrimination based upon a 
disability.28 
Each of these alternatives compels a reexamination of what we 
assume renders a person "disabled." For example, a person who uses a 
wheelchair rather than her legs for mobility due to the residual effects 
ofrheumatoid arthritis, is "disabled" under the social model onlyto the 
extent that buildings contain stairs, revolving doors, and counters that 
are more than thirty-four inches off the ground.29 If ramps and other 
features of universal design were ubiquitous, her inability to use her 
legs for mobility would have the same impact on her daily life as an 
25. LINTON, supra note 5, at 11; see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1479, 1486 (2001) ("One of the 
most strongly held tenets of disability rights ideology is the critique of professionalism. To 
many disability rights advocates, 'expert' professionals are more threat than help."). 
26. See Harlan Balm, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased 
Reasoning?, 21 BERKElEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 178-79 (2000) (stating that the minority group 
model contends that Americans with disabilities are entitled to the legal and constitutional 
protections that other disadvantaged groups receive); Harlan Balm, Introduction: Disability 
Policy and the Problem ofDiscrimination, 28 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 293, 294-99 (1985) (explaining 
the minority group model); Harlan Balm, The Potential Impact of Disability Studies on 
Political Science (As Hi&ll as Wee- ~rsa), 21 PoCY STUD. J. 740, 741 (1993) (stating that the 
minority group model differs from the traditional medical and social models ofdisability). 
27. See generally Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights 
Model ofDisability, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS, 
supra note 21, at 72 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) (grounding the discussion ofthe civil 
rights model in minority group language); Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 
55 ALA. L. REv. 1043, 1054 (2004) [hereinafter Rovner, Disability] (referring to the civil 
rights rhode! as an alternative name for the minority group model). 
28. See Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, ·Redefining "Disability" 
Discrimination: A Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers, 14 STAN. L. 
& PoCy REv. 321, 324-31 (2003) (demonstrating that the civil rights model includes a role of 
the environment in disabilitY discrimination); Rovner, Disability, supra note 27, at 1054 
(arguing that the civil rights model is an outgrowth of the social model); Laura L. Rovner, 
Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 247, 
272 [hereinafter Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma] (stating that with the final revision of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Congress moved towards a civil rights model of disability where 
the obstacles facing disabled people stem from both their physical limitations as well as the 
limitations imposed on them by society). 
29. See generally28 C.F.R. § 36 App. A. (2007) (the ADA "Standards for Accessible 
Design"). 
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inability to juggle or to raise one eyebrow, which are not generally 
regarded as disabilities.30 
While the medical and social models of disability each represent 
oversimplified descriptions of attitudes and experiences, contrasting 
the two approaches reveals important considerations regarding the role 
ofmedical concepts in the enforcement of a civil rights statute such as 
the ADA. 31 There was no examination of these theoretical models of 
disability at the time of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act's enactment 
(indeed, there was little, if any input, from disabled people in the 
drafting of the statute).32 The three-prong definition of disability from 
that earlier statute was included, in nearly identical form, in the ADA 
seventeen years later.33 The decision was not based upon a conclusion 
that the specific text of the provision was the best vehicle for 
advancing the civil rights of people with disabilities-indeed, many 
disability rights advocates felt that the Rehabilitation Act language, 
with its focus on impairment and limitations, held too closely to the 
medical model.34 However, federal courts had adopted a broad view of 
30. See generallyCtr. for Universal Design, N.C. State Univ. et al., Universal Design 
Education Online, http://www.udeducation.org/learn/index.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) 
("Universal Design is an approach to the design ofall products and environments to be usable 
by everyone, to the greatest extent possible, regardless ofage, ability, or situation."). 
31. More recently, many disability studies scholars have questioned the utility of 
strict compliance with the social model, particularly as it has been explained and used by 
British scholars. For example, Tom Shakespeare, a British disability studies scholar who 
once, as he describes it, "was a critical friend of the social model," has more recently argued 
that it is now time to abandon the model. TOM SHAKESPEARE,. DISABILITY RIGHTS AND 
WRONGS 5 (2006). Some scholars criticize the social model for "neglect[ing] the role of 
impairment" in the lives of disabled people. Id at 38-39 (citing the work of Sally French, Liz 
Crow, and Carol Thomas); see OLIVER, supra note 21, at 31, 37-41 ('~longside th[e] 
proliferation of different models [of disability,] disabled people themselves have begun to 
question the explanatory power· of the social model. I myself questioned the way the social 
model was becoming a straight jacket for our experience ...."). 
32. For a history of federal disability policy in the United States, including the 
enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, see RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 41-59 (2d ed. 2001), and Robert L. 
Burgdorf Jr., ''Substantially Limited" Protection !Tom Disability Discrimination: The Special 
Treatment Model and Misconstructions ofthe Definition ofDisability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409, 
415-31 (1997). 
33. See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti­
Discrimination Law: Mat Happened? My? And Mat Can We Do About It?, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 127-28 (2000) (discussing Congress's decision to utilize the 
existing defmition ofhandicap in Section 504 as the definition ofdisability for the ADA). 
34. See, e.g., Center & Irnparato, supra note 28, at 333 (noting that, when the ADA 
was initially proposed in 1988, the National Council on the Handicapped, later renamed the 
National Council on Disability, "asserted that the [Rehabilitation Act] approach was 
problematic because it forced a plaintiff to identify as an individual with a disability 
according to a medical model that emphasized the nature and scope of their 'impaim1ents' 
and 'limitations"'); NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF, supra note 10, at 6 (stating 
··-·----·------·--·------~----'-·~------------------
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disability when applying the Rehabilitation Act, and advocates had 
eve1y reason to expect that the identical text would receive the same 
treatment under the ADA. 35 The introduction of new definitional 
language, ADA proponents feared, could result in the defeat of the 
statute or lead to a more restrictive view of disability.36 
Thus, there was little, if any, discussion of the extent to which the 
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act either followed or rejected the medical 
model, or, conversely, adopted an alternative view such as the social or 
civil rights model. Indeed, scholars today have not reached a 
consensus on the extent to which the ADA reflects one model or the 
other.37 These differing opinions likely result from the fact that 
different models seem to be reflected in different parts of the statute. 
The requirements for barrier removal in existing buildings, accessible 
design in new construction, and reasonable accommodation, along 
with notions of perceived disability, all reflect aspects of the social or 
political rights views of disability discrimination.38 However, the 
definition of disability itself, ·with its individualized focus on 
impairment, is seemingly tied to the medical model.39 
In its 2004 report, Righting the ADA, the National Council on 
Disability, the staff of which were among the drafters of the ADA, 
.asserted that the ''ADA embodies a social concept of discrimination'"'0 
that the National Council on Disability's reco=endation to Congress regarding. disability 
legislation rejected the approach of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because of its 
emphasis on the medical model of disability). 
35. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF, supra note 10, at 9; Feldblum, 
supra note 33, at 128-29. Nearly identical definitions appear in the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988, see 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (2000), and in the provisions prohibiting 
discrimination in air transportation, see 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a)(l )-(3) (2000), as well as in 
numerous state antidiscrimination statutes. 
36. See Feldblum, supra note 33, at 91-92, 128-29. 
37. Compare Diller, supra note 27, at 72 ("The ADA's embrace of the civil rights 
model represents a break with the tradition of viewing the problems faced by people with 
disabilities as being principally medical in nature."), with Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma, supra 
note 28, at 273 ("While the new definition represents significant progress toward conceiving 
disability as a civil rights construct; an unpacking of its terms reveals remnants ofthe medical 
and social pathology models lurking just below the surface."). 
38. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability'; 86 VA. L. 
REv. 397, 433 (2000); Rower, Disability, supra note 27, at 1044 (noting that by "including 
the reasonable acco=odation mandate," .Congress "embraced and endorsed the socio­
political model of disability"). 
39. See O'BRIEN, supra note 12, at 6-7 (arguing that modem disability policy, 
including the ADA, reflects the "whole man theory" of disability, advanced by physicians in 
the field of rehabilitative medicine, which posits that "disabled people could, by striving, 
achieve normalcy"). 
40. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 109 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroornlpublications/2004/pdf/righting_ada.pdf However, the agency 
-----·--------·-------­
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while, at the same time, acknowledging that the Rehabilitation Act 
definition of disability (which is the same as that found in the ADA) 
"forced people to identify as a person with a disability according to a 
medical model that emphasized the nature and scope of their 
'impairments' and 'limitations.">41 The legal concept of "impairment" 
has its origins in disability determinations by physicians who were 
assessing a disability applicant's ability to work.42 The persistence of 
the term "impairment" created a tension in the ADA between notions 
of disability as being, on the one hand, a severe medical condition 
precluding employment, and, on the other, a disadvantage stemming 
largely from a socially imposed set of barriers, both physical and 
attitudinal. 
Disability rights advocates have argued in the wake of pro­
defendant rulings in ADA cases that the "domination of the medical 
definition" of disability in legal contexts serves as a major impediment 
to shifting notions of disability from a medical to a social or political 
category.43 While a requirement of medical proof does not necessarily 
follow from the presence of the term "impairment," the importation of 
the term to the ADA likely played into a long-standing series of 
assumptions that led to judges' improper requirement of such evidence 
to prove disability. 44 Under a traditional medical-based understanding 
of disability, as long as the source of the problem of a person's 
aclrnowledges that such a model is not explicit in the statute's language, and it proposes 
amending the legislative findings supporting the statute to reflect such model. See id. 
41. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF, supm note 10, at 6. 
42. DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 109-11 (1984). Stone states that the 
evolution of the means of evaluating impairment as a physician-based process was the result 
of the medical establishment's concerted effort to ensure that disability determination was 
their province, rather thari that of agency bureaucrats. I d. at 111-13. 
43. See LINTON, supra note 5, at 11 (stating that society's continued emphasis on the 
medical model of disability keeps the issue within the medical community and treats the 
individual with the condition, instead of changing the social policies that restrict disabled 
people); Crossley, supm note 21, at 668 ("A closer inspection of how agencies and courts 
approach the threshold concept of impairment ... reveals that, by and large, the application 
of the widely acclaimed civil rights statute reflects a medical model understanding of 
disability."); Rovner, Disability, supra note 27, at 1044-45 ("Over the past decade ... the 
success of the disability community in infusing the socio-political model of disability into 
federal law has begun to be eroded by judicial decisions interpreting the ADA that appear to 
be grounded in-and espousing-the medical model of disability."); c[ Margaret A. Winzer, 
Disability and Society Before the Eighteenth Century: Dread and Despair, in THE 
DISABILITY STUDIES READER 75, 84 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997) ("Throughout history, the 
medical aspects of disabilities have been paramount; other concerns relating to disability have 
been secondary, where they have been considered at all."). 
44: See, e.g., Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to 
present any admissible medical evidence ofhis alleged disability) . 
. ··.-- -.,.,.-_.,,-.-.~ 
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limitations is regarded as residing altogether with the person's body (or 
mind) as a defective, or abnormal, or pathological feature, there is no 
need to look beyond the body itself for a solution.45 ·Such a view 
suggests that the best way to overcome the limitations is to diagnose, 
treat, and, if possible, cure the pathology. Where such efforts to 
address the pathology fall short, they are nonetheless the extent of 
what can be done, and there is no need to broaden the inquiry of the 
source of limitations beyond the disabled person herself to any 
potential external causes. It follows, then, that the medical-based 
approach to disability would assume that medical providers serve as 
the primary source of information regarding limitations experienced 
by the individual.46 However, such an assumption is based not upon a 
reasonable reading of the statute's text but rather on precisely the 
notions about disability that lead to the disability-based discrimination 
that disability scholars sought to dispel. 
B 	 The Requirement of"Individualized Inquiry" and Corroborating 
Evidence UnderAgency Regulations and Jnte1pretive 
Commentary 
As noted above, the ADA itself provides no guidance on what 
evidence is needed to meet the defmition of disability. Specifically, 
the statute does not indicate to what extent, if any, medical evidence is 
an indispensable requirement47 to establishing either the presence of 
45. See Katharina Heyer, A Disability Lens on Sociolegal Research: Reading Rights 
of Inclusion Jiom a Disability Studies Perspective, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 261, 265 (2007) 
(reviewing DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W MONGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND 
IDENTITY INTHE LIFE STORY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003)) (stating that under the 
medical model of disability, the person's mental and physical impairments are responsible for 
the disability). 
46. See Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the 
Category ofDisability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 1, 8 (1999) 
("Since [under the prevailing biomedical model] disability is understood as a scientific fact, 
the entire domain-from determining its existence to prescribing its management-becomes 
the exclusive province ofmedical professionals."); 
47. By contrast, a few state statutes do contain specific references to a medical 
evidence requirement. For example, Kentucky's statute, apparently the most restrictive in this 
regard, defines physical disability as: "the physical condition ofa person whether congenital 
or acquired, which constitutes a substantial disability to that person and is demonstrable by 
medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." KY. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 207.130(2) (LexisNexis 2007) (emphasis added). Other states' statutes provide a plaintiff 
with a series ofmeans to prove disability, one of which is through the results of medical tests. 
The New York statute's definition of disability states: "a physical, mental or medical 
impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions 
which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically 
accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques ...." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21) 
--·-----·-----·-­-----~--·~--
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impainnent or the substantial limitation on one or more major life 
activities.48 The legislative history is similarly silent regarding what 
proof would be required to prove disability or whether there would be 
a need for corroborating or medical evidence for meeting the 
definition of disability.49 
With little in the statute to guide litigants and courts on the 
application of the definition of disability, much of the analysis in 
litigation has focused on the agency interpretive regulations, most 
notably those promulgated in 1991 by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to apply to Title I of the ADA, 
which prohibits discrimination in employmeneo While these 
regulations say little regarding the role of medical evidence in 
evaluating claims, certain language in the regulations ultimately served · 
as a basis for many courts' requirement of medical evidence. 5 1 Most 
significant is the EEOC implementing regulations' emphasis on 
individualized inquiry on the issue of disability. Specifically, the 
regulations define the term substantially limits in the definition of 
disabilitY2 as follows: 
(McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). New Jersey's definition of disability 
includes: "any mental, psychological or developmental disability resulting from anatomical, 
psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal exercise of 
any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted 
clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 2007) 
(emphasis added). Notwithstanding the use of the disjunctive "or," the case law ofNewYork 
and New Jersey is generally regarded as imposing a requirement ofmedical evidence to prove 
disability. SeeNAT'LCOUNCILONDISABILITY,POLICYBIUEF, supmnote 10, at 19,32 n.43, 33 
n.45. 
48. The regulations and cases set forth a clearer role for medical evidence in "direct 
threat" affirmative defenses, an area that is outside the scope of this Article. Briefly stated, 
the ADA permits employers' job qualifications to "include a requirement that an individual 
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the 
workplace." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b )(2) (2007); accord 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000); see 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002). A requirement of medical 
evidence to support such a defense is appropriate since the operation of the defense does not 
turn on facts inherent to the plaintiff and her life but upon questions of contagion and risk 
assessment that are properly within the· sphere of expert testimony. See Tory L. Lucas, 
Disabling Complexity: The Americans with Disabilities Act of1990 and Its Interaction with 
OtherFederalLaws, 38 CREIGHTONL. REV. 871, 898 (2005). 
49. SeeFeldblum, supra note 33, at 126-34. 
50. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-1630.16 (2007); Susan E. Dallas, Sutton: Use of 
Mitigating Measures to Determine Disability Under the ADA, CoLO. LAW., Mar. 1999, at 59, 
59 .(stating that the courts often look to the EEOC's interpretive guidance because the ADA 
does not define "physical or mental impairment," "substantially limits," or "major life 
activity"). The statutory authority for the promulgation of interpretive regulations by the 
EEOC is found at 42 U.S.C.- § 12116. 
51. See, e.g., Rieger v. Or!or, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 105, 116-18 (D. Conn. 2006). 
52. 42 u.s.c. § 12102(2). 
··-----·-·-.···
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1. The term substantially limits means: 
i. 	 Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in 
the general population can perfonn; or 
ii. 	Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration 
under which an individual can perform a particular major life 
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or· duration under 
which the average person in the general population can perform 
that same major life activity. 
2. The following factors should be considered in determining whether · 
an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity: 
i. The nature and severity ofthe impairment; 

ii The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and . 

iii The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or 

long term impact of or resulting from the impairmene3 
Professor Chai Feldblum, one of the advocates centrally involved 
in the drafting and passage of the ADA, has observed: "[T]he EEOC 
regulations introduced, for the first time in disability jurisprudence, the 
concept that an individualized assessment would be required, in most 
cases, to determine whether a person had a disability tinder the 
ADA."54 This, Feldblum argues, is at odds with traditional notions of a 
civil rights classification, which would "not necessarily require a 
searching, individualized assessment of whether a person is really a 
'handicapped individual,' any more than Title VII requires a searching, 
individualized assessment of whether a plaintiff is really a woman or 
an African-American."55 However, advocates were not especially 
concerned with the. enactment of these regulations when they were 
initially promulgated because court decisions applying the 
Rehabilitation Act had rarely engageq in extensive analysis of the 
definition of disability and had employed a broad view of the statute's 
scope.5 6 
The ADA regulations suggest, however, that specific information 
is required regarding the impact of the impairment on the plaintiff, 
along with comparative evidence regarding how that impact compares 
with limitations expenenced by the average person in the general 
population.57 This language leaves little question that a diagnosis alone 
53. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G) (2007) (emphasis added). 
54. Feldblum, supra note 33, at 135. 
55. Id at 111. 
56. Id at 137. 	 . 
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G) (2007). A few courts have interpreted the reference in 
the EEOC regulations to an individual's relative limitations as compared with the "general 
population" to require expert medical testimony on not only the plaintiff's condition, but that 
of others generally. See, e.g., Rieger v. Odor, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 105, 118 (D. Conn. 2006) 
16 
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will be insufficient to establish disability, and signals that there are 
several components of proofrequired to establish that an individual 
meets the definition. The EEOC's "Interpretive Guidance" to the Title 
I regulations notes: 
The ADA and this part, like the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, do not 
attempt a "laundry list" of impairments that are "disabilities." The 
determination of whether an individual has . a disability is not 
necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the 
person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the 
individual. Some impairments may be disabling for particular 
individuals but not for others, depending on the stage of the disease or 
disorder, the presence of other impairments that combine to make the 
impairment disabling or any number ofother factors .... 
The determination ofwhether an individual is substantially limited in 
a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis. 5 8 
Courts have followed this guidance and consistently applied the case­
by-case approach to disability evaluations.59 Thus; although the nearly 
· (finding that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence that her difficulty in sleeping was greater 
than that of the general population); Duncan v. Convergys Corp., No. 1:03CV35DAK, 2004 
WL 2358104, at *5 (D. Utah Oct. 13, 2004) (stating that the plaintiff failed to show that her 
problems interacting· with others were any worse than those of the average person and so 
concluding that no substantially limiting impairment existed). However, most courts 
addressing the issue specifically have concluded that the reference to comparative limitations 
in major life activities in the EEOC regulations does not necessarily require the use of expert 
testimony. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 R3d 789, 802 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that because no comparative evidence is needed to support the plaintiff's claim, 
jurors could evaluate testimony based on their "own life experience[s]"); Lowe v. Angelo's 
Italian Foods, Inc., 87 R3d 1170, 1174 (lOth Cir. 1996) (stating that although comparative 
evidence could be helpful for fact finder, it is not required where a plaintiff with multiple 
sclerosis provided sufficient evidence that she could not lift items in excess of fifteen 
pounds); Crutcher v. Mobile Hous. Bd., No. Civ.A.04-0499-WS-M, 2005 WL 2675207, at 
*10-11 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 2005) (finding that no comparative evidence is needed to 
demonstrate substantial limitations arising from the plaintiff's inability to use an arm); EEOC 
v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. 98Civ. 2270(THK), 2002 WL 31011859, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 9, 2002) (holcliitg that there is no "rigid evidentiary requirement" of comparative 
evidence, and that "[c ]ommon sense and life experiences will permit fmders of fact to 
determine whether someone who cannot sit for more than this period of time is significantly 
restricted as compared to the average person"); Witt v. Nw. Aluminum Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d 
1127, 1131 (D. Or. 2001) (noting that no comparative evidence is needed to demonstrate 
substantial limitation in activity ofwalking). 
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (2007) (discussing section 1630.20)). 
59. See, e.g., EEOC v. Woodbridge Corp., 263 R3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 2001); 
Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 R3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 1998); Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 130 R3d 893, 900 n.4 (lOth Cir. 1997); MacGovem v. Hamilton Sunstrand 
Corp., 170 R Supp. 2d 301,309 (D. Conn. 2001); McClearyv. Nat'! Cold Storage, Inc., 67 R 
Supp. 2d 1288, 1299 (D. Kan. 1999). 
2007] WHO SAYS YOU'RE DISABLED? 17 

identical definition of disability is used under the ADA as was used in 
the Rehabilitation Act, courts approach the question of coverage much 
differently. 60 
The United States Supreme Court confirmed the appropriateness 
of the individualized inquiry in Albertson S, Inc. v. Kirldngburg, where 
the Court chastised the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit for being "too quick to find a disability" in the case of a 
plaintiff who had "20/200 vision in his left eye and monocular vision 
in effect."61 The Court wrote: "[T]he Court of Appeals did not pay . 
much. heed to the statutory obligation to determine the existence of 
disabilities on a case-by-case basis. The [ADA] expresses that 
mandate clearly by defining 'disability' 'with respect to an individual,' 
and in terms of the impact of an impairment on 'such individual."'62 
Specifically, this means that plaintiffs must "prove a disability by 
offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own 
experience . . . is substantial."63 
This suggests that courts must engage in a searching analysis of 
whether a person who self-identifies as "disabled," .in fact meets the 
definition of disabled under the ADA.64 The decision makes no 
reference, however, to whether medical evidence is required to meet 
the definition. 65 
60. For a general discussion, see Feldblum, supra note 33, at 139-60. Feldblum notes 
that "[i]n cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act, courts rarely considered what it meant 
for an impairment to substantially limit a major life activity, and rarely considered what made 
a life activity sufficiently major." Id at 147. She suspects that part of the reason that the 
issue of whether a plaintiff is disabled became a central issue in ADA litigation is due to the 
large number of seminars for employers and other potential defendants that focused on each 
aspect of the statute. Jd at 138-39. 
61. 527 u.s. 555, 559, 564 (1999). 
62. Jd at 566 (citations omitted). 
63. Jd at 567. 
64. For an insightful critique of this "individualized" inquiry approach by Professor 
Wendy E. Parmet, see Individual Rights and Class Discninination: The Fallacy of 811 
Individualized Determination ofDisability, 9 TEMP. PoL. & Crv. R:rs. L. REv. 283, 285 (2000). 
She notes that the notion of an "individualized determination of disability" may initially 
appear "to be consistent with the ADA's goals" of protecting individual rights. Jd at 284. 
However, as she demonstratc;:s, this approach, which requires a retrospective determination of 
whether the plaintiff is "disabled," in fact precludes the ADA from operating as a measure to 
prevent discrimination and to improve access. Jd at 297. She also notes that many of the 
problems of such approach "derive not from the fact of an individualized analysis but from 
the rigor with which it is applied." Jd at 298. The imposition of a medical evidence 
requirement discussed herein serves as one example of such unwarranted rigor. 
65. The Supreme Court has never weighed in on whether or to what extent medical 
evidence is required to establish disability. In Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630-31 
(1998), decided the year before Albertson's, the Court held that the HIV-positive plaintiff had 
established that she was disabled under the first prong of the ADA's definition of disability. 
18 
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In interpretive materials, the EEOC has not taken a clear or 
consistent approach ·to the role of medical evidence in such 
individualized inquiries. One of the few references to such evidence in 
the postenactment commentary on implementation of the ADA is 
contained in the EEOC's 1997 EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and Psyclllatric Disabilities.66 In 
discussing "substantial limitation" of a major life activity, the 
Commission notes: 
Relevant evidence for EEOC investigators includes descriptions of an 
individual's typical level of functioning at home, at work, and in other 
settings, as well as evidence showing that the individual's functional 
limitations are linked to his/her impairment. Expert testimony about 
substantial limitation is not necessarily required Credible testimony 
from the individual with a disability and his/her family members, 
friends, or coworkers may suffice. 67 
This language unequivocally states that medical evidence is not 
required per se. By contrast, however, in the part discussing the Title I 
(employment) definition of the term "disability" contained in the 
Commission's ADA Compliance Manual, a publication directed at 
EEOC investigators, the EEOC suggests that medical documentation 
may be necessary as part of an investigation if the claimed disability is 
not "obvious" to the investigator, in which case the investigator is to 
take steps to obtain medical documentation. 68 In a footnote, the agency 
reminds investigators that medical documentation may also be 
necessary to determine if the impairment results in a substantial 
limitation of one or more major life activities.69 Medical evidence may 
There was no dispute that the plaintiff was in fact HIV-positive; rather, the controversy 
focused on whether the HIV infection resulted in a substantial limitation of a major life 
activity. Id at 641. It appears from the Court's decision that while the record was replete 
with epidemiological research and other medical literature about the course and effects ofthe 
HIV infection (which was supplemented by several amicus curiae briefs from various 
medical organizations), there was no reference to medical evidence from the plaintiff's own 
physician. Jd at 633-41. The plaintiff offered evidence, through her own statements, that 
"HIV infection placed a substantial limitation on her ability to reproduce and to bear 
children." Id at 637. 
66. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 4 (1997) [hereinafter 
EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE]. 
67. Id (emphasis added). 
68. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANuAL 
§ 902(b) (2001). 
69. 
A diagnosis is relevant to determining whether a charging party has an impairment. 
It is important to remember, however, that a diagnosis may be insufficient to 
. ' 
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, . also be viewed as a good starting point for evaluating the duration and 
impact of impairment.'0 
While courts have relied heavily on the EEOC's interpretation of 
the ADA when adopting the case-by-case individualized inquiry 
described in the EEOC regulations and guidance, no courts have 
referred to the above-quoted passages in their analyses of the need (or 
lack thereof) to produce medical documentation to establish a prima 
facie case. 71 Nonetheless, as discussed below, the language used by 
courts, particularly with respect to notions of "corroboration" and 
"obviousness," parallels the guidance language in the regulations and 
manua1.72 
Ill. 	 JUDGES' IMPOSITION OF A MEDICAL EVIDENCE REQUIRE:tv1ENT IN 
DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE ADA . 
The reported decisions applying the ADA have overwhelmingly 
favored defendants, especially in the employment context.73 Most 
notably, and unexpectedly, a substantial number of plaintiffs' claims 
are found io fall short of a prima facie case at the summary judgment 
stage for failing to establish that the plaintiff is a person with a 
determine ifthe charging party has a disability. Ari impairment rises to the level of 
a disability when it substantially limits one or more major life activities. The 
investigator, therefore, also should obtain available medical or other documentation · 
that describes the extent to which the impairment limits the charging party's major 
life activities. 
ld at 902.2(h) n.6; see id § 902.4(c). 
70. 	 Seeid § 902.4(d). 
71. See, e.g., Marinelli v. City ofErie, 216 F.3d 354, 360-61 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing the 
EEOC's interpretation, but ultimately holding that the plaintiff's ADA claim failed because he 
did not produce any medical evidence of his disability). 
72. For example, in the EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities, the use of the word "and" between "the 
individual with a disability" and the other categories of potential sources of information 
suggests that the agency contemplated the need for some kind of corroborating evidence of 
disability, but not necessarily medical evidence. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 
66, at4. · 
73. See RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 
AMER:ICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 69-95 (2005) [hereinafter COLKER, DISABILITY 
PENDULUM]; AmyL. Allbright, 2004 Employment Decisions Under the·ADA Tftle I-survey 
Update, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 513, 513 (2005); Ruth Colker, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act· A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 
100 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, Windfallj; Kathryn Moss et al., Prevalence and Outcomes of 
ADA Employment Discrimination Claims in the Federal Courts 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITYL. REP. 303,303 (2005). 
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disability.74 Several judges specifically note a failure to include expert 
medical evidence in the summary judgment record as being the 
primary deficiency in the evidence offered by a plaintiff to 
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue ofmaterial fact. 75 
Court opinions follow several different approaches regarding the 
role of medical evidence in meeting the definition of disability under 
the ADA, either with respect to showing the presence of an impairment 
or demonstrating that such impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity. While judges apply a variety of approaches and rationales, the 
results can be divided into three broad categories. First, led primarily 
by the courts under the United States Court ofAppeals for the Second 
Circuit, one group of courts imposes a requirement of expert medical 
evidence to establish disability, with no apparent exceptions.76 A 
second group takes a case-by-case approach to the requirement, basing 
the need for medical evidence upon the nature of the claimed disability 
and whether such condition is obvious and presumably within the 
understanding of the jury.77 The third group, comprised of the smallest 
number of courts, states unequivocally that expert medical evidence is 
notrequiJ;ed to establish a prima facie claim under the ADA.78 Thus, 
the dominant trend in the decisions is to assign a central and 
indispensable role to· medical professionals in establishing disability 
for purposes ofthe ADA. 
74. See Berg, supra note 46, at 2-3 (stating that the majority ofADA cases deal with 
the issue of whether the plaintiff is disabled and most conclude that they are not); Feldblum, 
supra note 33, at 93. 
75. Implicit in these holdings is that the medical evidence offered by a plaintiff in 
support of her claim of disability would need to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 as such evidence would be based upon "scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge," even if the evidence is offered through a plaintiff's treating 
physician. FED. R. Evm. 701-02; see, e.g., Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 
756 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that treating physicians are not exempt from the "expert" 
testimony requirements of Rule 702). This requirement would therefore trigger the plaintiff's 
obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the designation of expert 
witnesses expected to testify at trial, and the furnishing of qualifications and other materials 
during the discovery period. See FED. R. Clv. P. 26(a)(2); Musser, 356 F.3d 756-57 (holding 
that a plaintiff must designate her treating physician as a potential expert witness during 
discovery if such physician's testimony will be offered at trial). 
76. Seeinfianotes 79-95 and accompanying text. 
77. See infia notes 96-107 and accompanying text. 
78. Seeinfianotes 108-125 and accompanying text. 
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A. 	 Courts Requiring Expert Medical Evidence To Establish 
Disability 
The first line of cases holds that medical evidence is always 
required to establish disability under the ADA and that absent such 
evidence in a summary judgment or trial record, a plaintiff necessarily 
fails to establish a prima facie case of disability. Based upon these 
cases, even in the absence of any evidence generated by a defendant 
controverting a plaintiff's claims of disability, a court can nonetheless 
enter judgment for a defendant if it concludes that the plaintiff has 
failed to make such a prima facie showing. 79 This line of cases 
originated with a Rehabilitation Act case decided by the Second 
Circuit, Heilweil. v. Mount Sinai Hospital, shortly after the effective 
date oftheADA.80 The court affirmed the entry of summary judgment 
for the defendant-employer and noted briefly that among other 
inadequacies in the plaintiff's record evidence, there was an absence of 
medical evidence to support her claim that she could not work in 
poorly vented areas as a result ofher asthma. 81 
This opinion led to the rigid imposition of the requirement that 
medical evidence is invariably required to establish disability under the 
ADA in the district courts of the Second Circuit. For example, in 
Douglas v. M'ctor Capital Group, the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York granted the defendant-employer's 
motion for summary judgment on a plaintiff's claim that he was 
terminated from employment after his employer discovered that he had 
Legg-Perthes disease, spinal stenosis, and anxiety. 82 The primary basis 
for the court's decision· (as articulated by the magistrate judge in a 
recommended decision ultimately adopted by the court) was the 
plaintiff's failure to offer admissible medical evidence to support his 
claim of disability.83 The plaintiff submitted an affidavit and deposition 
testimony describing his conditions and their impact on his ability to 
walk.84 The only medical evidence submitted by the plaintiff consisted 
79. See, e.g., Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998). 
80. 	 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994). 
81. 	 Id at 723. 
82. 	 21 F. Supp. 2d at 380-81 (affirming recommended decision ofmagistrate judge). 
83. 	 Id at 383-84. 
84. Id The magistrate judge's recommended decision describes the sworn evidence 
offered by the plaintiff in support of his claim that he has substantial limitation in the major 
life activity of walking as follows: 
According to Douglas, his medical conditions affect his walking and 
standing: 
;,...:;·,;":;.,;'?,l<>·tt<>~'c(+rn11n.his physicians, which were excluded from 
·"h·p:;:-::;;.,,;.·r..-r•i'l·•·o•'" ll~a\JLU.U..:J.:J~.u~v hearsay.85 The court reasoned, relying upon 
•''sev:er~l other cases, that "Douglas' [ s] testimony 
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as to the (alleged) 
limits on his ability to walk, without supporting medical testimony, 
simply is not sufficient to establish his prima facie case under the 
ADA."86 Stating it another way, and making it unequivocally clear that 
medical evidence is an indispensable requirement for establishing a 
prima facie case, the magistrate judge stated: ''Accordingly, I 
recommend that defendants' summary judgment motion be granted for 
Douglas' [ s] failure to make out a prima facie case, that is, his failure to 
submit any admissible medical evidence to demonstrate that his . 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity."87 
The courts following this line of cases did not analyze the issue of 
requiring medical evidence until the 2003 opinion of the Southern 
District of New York in Sussle v. Sirina Protection Systems Corp.88 
The plaintiff contended that he was substantially limited by Hepatitis C 
and the medication he took to treat it in the major life activities of 
I can't walk that far. I can't walk a half a block, a block at any time without 
stopping for five, ten minutes, leaning to rest and then continue. 
For that reason, he drives to work · 
Douglas expanded on this in his affidavit, under the heading "My Physical 
Limitations and Restrictions": · 
28) As a result of the above conditions, I have the following limitations 
and restrictions throughout all ofmy daily activities: 
a) I cannot walk more than one-half a street block without having to stop 
and wait for the pain or discomfort to subside. 
b) I cannot run and I cannot lift anything. 
c) I cannot put on my socks or tie my shoes. My wife does this for me. 
d) I cannot function without substantial daily medication. Among many 
drugs, I presently take three percocets per day for pain. 
e) 	 I cannot attend any sporting event for I cannot sit on hard chairs or 
benches. I require special chairs and can endure only a limited sitting 
time. 
f) I cannot walk anywhere without a cane to assist me. I own 15 canes. 
g) I use crutches more frequently as the years go by, and now perhaps 
three times per month. I own 3 sets ofcrutches. 
h) In addition to a cane, I walk with a decided limp, which is apparent to 
anyonewho looks at me. 
Id at 383 (internal citations omitted). 
The court also noted apparently contradictory deposit_ion testimony regarding the extent 
of plaintiff's limitations. Id However, such contradictions bear on the plaintiff's credibility, 
not on whether there is a genuine issue ofmaterial fact regarding the extent ofhis disability. 
85. Id at 383-84. · The court gave the plaintiff a deadline to submit admissible 
medical documentation in support of his claim, but he failed to do'so. Id at 381,384 n.4. 
86. Id at 392. 	 .· '· 
87. JC: at393. 	 ' · ... 
88. 269 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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reproduction, sexual relations, walking, concentrating, and climbing 
stairs.89 In support of his assertion, he submitted an affidavit and 
deposition testimony describing "various limitations which he 
attributed to Hepatitis C" and the prescribed treatmeneo 
The court described the plaintiff's affidavit as contammg 
"descriptions [that] were based wholly on his personal characteriza­
tions of those limitations," and that he offered no medical evidence to 
"substantiate the extent of his limitations."91 The court noted the long 
line of cases in the district courts of the Second ·Circuit requiring 
medical evidence and concluded: "These cases persuade us that where 
the Plaintiff relies solely on his own testimony and fails 'to offer any 
medical evidence substantiating the specific limitations to which he 
claims he is subject due to his condition,' he cannot establish thathe is 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA."92 "[T]o allow otherwise," 
the court reasoned, "would ensure that a plaintiff could defeat a motion 
for summary judgment on the basis of conjecture or surmise."93 A 
significant number of cases in other jurisdictions follow the Second 
Circuit approacht accounting for many of the ADA claims that were 
89. Id at 301. In that case, there was no issue regarding the showing of an 
impairment for the first step of the analysis;· the court noted that it was well-settled in other 
cases that Hepatitis C was an impairment for purposes of the ADA, and the defendants did 
not dispute that finding. Id at 297. 
90. Id at 301. 
91. Id 
92. Id at 302. The court observed, "[d]istrict courts in the Second Circuit have 
repeatedly held that a plaintiff's personal testimony which describes the alleged limits that 
affect a major life activity, 'without supporting medical testimony, simply is not sufficient to 
establish his prima facie case under the ADA."' Id at 301 (quoting Douglas, 21 F. Supp. 2d 
at392). 
93. Id at 303. 
94. See, e.g., Maulding v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 1992); Kaley v. Icon 
Int'l Inc., No. IP99-1750-CHIK, 2001 WL 1781898, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 4, 2001); Cardwell 
v. Bd. ofEduc., No. 00 C 7147,2001 WL 1064334, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2001); Sabrah v. 
Lucent Techs., Inc., No. Civ.A.3:96-CV-2827-D, 1998 WL 792503, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Noy. 6, 
1998); McGrawv. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021 (D. Minn. 1998); Baxter 
v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. 96 C 2060, 1998 WL 603121; at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1998); Estate 
ofHirsch v. Nat'l Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977,981-82 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Kalekiristos v. 
CTS Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 641, 657 (D.D.C. 1997), afftf, 132 F.3d 1481 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997); Kriskovic v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (E.D. Wise. 1996); 
Buchanan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. C 95-1658 FMS, 1996 WL 723089, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 6, 1996); Taylor v. Dover Elevator Sys., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 455, 464 (N.D. Miss. 1996); 
Farley v. Gibson Container, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 322, 326 (N.D. Miss. 1995); Aucutt v. Six Flags 
Over Mid-Am., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 736, 744 (E.D. Mo. 1994), aff'd 85 F.3d 1311 (8th Cir. 
1996). 
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halted at the sunrrnary judgment stage for failing to meet the statutory 
definition of disability.95 
B. Courts Requiring Medical EVJdence in Some, but NotAl], Cases 
A second line of cases holds that expert medical evidence is 
sometimes needed to establish a prima facie case of disability, and that 
the necessity depends upon the type of disability claimed and whether 
it is found by the court to be within the comprehension of the average 
lay juror.96 In Katz v. City Metal Co., the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit touched on the issue of the role ofmedical 
95. A small group of cases purports not to impose a strict requirement of producing 
medical evidence but, nonetheless, weighs the absence of such evidence heavily when 
granting summary judgment for a defendant, effectively. resulting in the imposition of such 
requirement. Such courts reason that a plaintiff's failure to produce medical evidence can 
"cut against" a claim of disability, but do not rule against a plaintiff on that basis alone, as 
done expressly by the courts following the Second Circuit approach discussed above. For 
example, in Lakota v. Sonoco Products Co., the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts ruled that a plaintiff's failure to present medical evidence to· show the 
existence of the claimed impairment (deep vein thrombosis) was only "a factor weighing 
against his claim." No. Civ.A. 00-30219-FHF, 2002 WL 596211, at *3 (D. Mass. Apr. 4, 
2002); see also Dom v. Potter, 191 F. Supp. 2d 612, 623 0N.D. Pa. 2002) (noting that the lack 
of medical evidence in support of plaintiff's claims was "especially damaging ... given the 
other weaknesses in plaintiff's claim of disability"). · 
A few decisions also suggest that while there is a requirement for a plaintiff to point to 
objective "corroborating" or "affmnative" evidence of disability in the record, such evidence 
must not necessarily be expert medical testimony per se. See, e.g., Brandon v. Klingensmith 
Healthcare, Inc., No. Civ.A.03-1963, 2005 WL 3434141, at *4 C'N.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005) 
(recognizing that there are cases where a plaintiff's testimony, in the absence of expert 
evidence, was enough to support his or her disability claim under the ADA); Martyne v. 
Parkside Med. Servs., No. 97 C 8295, 2000 WL 748096, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2000) 
(holding that "objective evidence" is required to prove disability from depression). For 
example, the lay observations of coworkers and family members may be sufficient in such 
cases. See Brandon, 2005 WL 3434141, at *4 (noting that the plaintiff failed to submit 
affidavits not only from her medical providers but also from "family members, health care 
workers, friends, or others who assisted her with [major life] activities, or from any one who 
witnessed her difficulties"). Such a comment echoes the suggestion in the EEOC 
Enforcement Guidance on psychiatric disabilities that the statements of laypersons may be 
relevant to determining whether a person is disabled. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, 
supra. note 66, at 4. Nonetheless, in these decjsions as well, it appears that the absence of 
medical evidence leads courts to dismiss a plaintiff's claims, though not explicitly stated, and 
the Author has located no decisions in which the observations of lay witnesses, in the absence 
of medical evidence, served as a basis to find a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of 
disability. 
96. This approach is considered by some courts to be the ''majority" rule. Marinelli 
v. City of Erie, 216 FJd 354, 360 (3d Cir. 2000) (referring to the "oft-cited" discussion of the 
issue in Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996)); Gallimore v. Newman Mach. Co., 
301 F. Supp. 2d 431, 444 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (stating that the failure to produce medical 
evidence of a disability is not necessarily fatal to a plaintiff's claim of disability under the 
ADA). However, that position appears to be held by the Second Circuit, based upon this 
Author's survey and compilation of cases, for which a case chart is on file with the Author. 
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evidence but only in dictum.97 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that he 
was fired from his job as a result of a heart attack and subsequent 
complications.98 After the plaintiff's physician declined to appear at 
trial on the scheduled date, the trial court denied the plaintiff's requests _ 
to offer the testimony in rebuttal or to continue the trial, and later 
granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter oflaw.99 
On appeal, the panel noted that while medical evidence was not 
required to demonstrate that the plaintiff had an impairment on the 
facts below, such evidence was required to establish that the plaintiff 
was substantially limited in a major life activity from such 
impairment. 100 The court cautioned: "There is certainly no general 
rule that medical testimony is always necessary to establish 
disability."101 There may be "[s]ome long-term impairments [that] 
would be obvious to a lay jury (e.g., a missing arm)," and the court did 
not preclude the possibility that a plaintiff could "himself . . . offer a 
description of treatments and symptoms over a substantial period that 
would put the jury in a position . . . [to] determine that he did suffer 
from a disability within the meaning ofthe ADA."102 
The Katz decision is remarkable in that it was one of the first to 
suggest expressly that the requirement ofmedical evidence to establish 
a prima facie case of disability should turn on the nature and, more 
specifically, the "obviousness" of the claimed impairment (or its long­
97. 87 F.3d at 32. Indeed, a number of district courts within the First Circuit have 
ruled in favor of defendants, based at least in part upon plaintiffs' failure to offer medical 
evidence in support of a claimed disability, with no reference to Katz. Se~ e.g., Poh v. Mass. 
Corr. Officers Federated Union, No. 03-11987-RWZ, 2006 WL 1877089, at *2 (D. Mass. 
July 7, 2006) (finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that he was disabled when the only 
evidence offered in support of a substantial limitation on major life activities was "his own 
. affidavit" and that he had specifically failed to submit medical evidence of such limitations); 
Cruz Carrillo v. AMR Eagle, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D.P.R. 2001) (finding that the 
plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving a substantiaLlirnitation on the major life activity 
of reproduction because he was not a medical expert and did not present any objective 
evidence in support ofhis position). · 
98. Katz, 87 F.3d at 28-29. 

99.• Id at29-30. 

100. Id at 31. The panel contrasted that case with Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17; 
20-21 (1st Cir. 1993), in which the plaintiff claimed disability based upon "morbid obesity." 
Katz, 87 F.3d at 31 n.4. In such a case, "it is not obvious to a lay jury that the condition 
affects one of the bodily systems listed in the [EEOC] regulations;' and therefore, expert 
testimony may be necessary to avoid judgment as a matter oflaw. Id 
101. Idat32. 
102. Id Ultimately, however, the panel concluded that it need not resolve the issue of 
whether the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence of ·~actual disability" because there 
was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the plaintiff was regarded as disabled, thus 
meeting the third prong of the definition of disability, permitting the case to go to the jury. 
Id 
J 
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term impact) and whether the l~itations from such impairment would 
be understood by a lay jury without the assistance of expert testimony. 
This approach was followed by the United States Court ofAppeals for 
the Third Circuit in Marinelli v. Cjty ofEde, where the panel held that 
the nature of the plaintiff's disability-a shoulder and arm injury­
was within the comprehension of the jury. 103 Although the court 
followed Katz in holding that the requirement of medical evidence 
turns on the nature of the claimed impairment, the reasoning employed 
actually runs somewhat counter to that in Katz. 104 The court 
characterized the plaintiff's condition as "among those ailments that 
are the least technical in · nature and are the most amenable to 
comprehension by a lay jury."105 Since the plaintiff's claimed 
limitations resulted almost entirely from pain, which is of course not 
"obvious" to anyone other than the person experiencing it, the court 
demonstrated little concern for issues of credibility or corroboration. 106 
A handful of district courts have cited Katz, Marinelli, or both when 
holding that a plaintiff's failure to offer expert medical evidence in 
support of a claim ·of disability was not necessarily fatal, due to the 
nature ofthe specific impairment at issue in the case. 107 
As a practical matter, the difference between the approach tal(en 
by this line of cases and that of the Second Circuit's Hdlwdlprogeny 
is largely a matter of degree. Defendants likely raise the issue of an 
absence of medical evidence more often in cases where a disability is 
103. 216 F.3d 354, 361 (3d Cir. 2000). However, the panel ultimately vacated the trial 
court's judgment upholding the jury's verdict for the plaintiff on the basis that there was 
insufficient evidence ofsubstantial limitation of a major life activity. Id at 366. 
104. See id at 360. 
105. Id at 361. 
106. See id (stating that because the plaintiff's arm and neck pain are readily 
understandable by a lay person, his failure to present corroborating medical testimony is not 
fatal to his disability claim under the ADA). 
107. See, e.g., Gallimore v. Newman Mach. Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 431, 444 (M.D.N.C. 
2004) (musculoskeletal conditions); Dicino v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, No. Civ. 01-3206(JBS), 
2003 WL 21501818, at *6-7 (D.N.J. June 23, 2003) (chronic pancreatitis resulting in back 
and abdominal pain); Gourley v. Home Depot, No. CN.A.99-5728, 2001 WL 755102, at *3 
n.6 (B.D. Pa. June 29, 2001) (hearing loss); Wolz v. Deaton-Kennedy Co., No. 98 C 6610, 
2001 WL 699096, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2001) (fibromyalgia); Alitovski v. Elgin 
Corrugated Box Co., No. 99 C 5018, 2001 WL 185479, *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2001) 
(shoulder and wrist impairments); United States v. City of Denver, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 
1239-40 (D. Colo. 1999) (multiple plaintiffs with different disabilities). Also, the case law 
under New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) contains a similar approach to that 
seen in the Katz-Marinelli line, in that the requirement of "expert medical evidence" can turn 
on the extent to which a claimed impairment is "readily apparent," and "courts place a high 
premium on the use and strength of objective medical testimony in proving the specific 
elements of each test contained in the statute.". Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 800 A.2d 826, 
835 (N.J. 2002). 
' tl 
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not obvious, and therefore, the defendant is challenging whether the 
plaintiff falls within the scope of the ADA's protections, which does 
not occur in every ADA case. It is improbable that the seemingly 
inflexible approach would be in fact that exacting in all conceivable 
cases. Despite their use of mandatory language, it is unlikely that 
courts following the Heilweilline ·would require a paraplegic plaintiff 
who uses a wheelchair for mobility to provide medical evidence that 
he is substantially limited in the major life activity of walking. Thus, 
the distinction between the approaches is largely a matter of how 
broadly each line of cases regards the notion of an "obvious" disability. 
C 	 Courts Holding that Medical Evidence Is Never Required To 
Establish Disability 
Finally, the third line of cases suggests that while medical 
evidence can be used to bolster a claim of disability, its absence should 
not be fatal to a plaintiff's prima facie case. The leading cases in this 
line are Haynes v. Williams, decided by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in 2004/08 and Head v. Glacier 
Northwest Inc., decided by the United States Court ofAppeals for the 
Ninth Circuit the following year. 109 
The Haynes panel's discussion of the issue of whether courts 
should require ADA plaintiffs to offer expert medical evidence of 
disability arose in the context of an employee's appeal from the entry 
of summary judgment for the defendant-employer on claims that the 
defendant failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for plaintiff's 
disability (idiopathic pruritis, a skin condition). and then terminated 
him on the basis of the disability. 110 The district court concluded that 
the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that he was substantially limited 
in the major life activity of sleeping because he relied solely upon 
"self-serving assertions" and failed to submit expert testimony in 
support of such assertions. 111 
On appeal, the panel affirmed the entry of summary judgment 
but noted in dictum that the trial court erred in requiring the plaintiff to 
produce expert medical testimony. 112 Quoting the Supreme Court's 
108. 	 392 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
109. 413 F.3d 1053 (9thCir. 2005). 

llO. HaJ71es, 392 F.3d at 480-82. 

lll. Id at482 (quoting Haynes v. Williams, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2003)). 

112. Id at 482, 485. The panel affirmed on the alternate basis for the entry of 
judgment for the defendant, which was the plaintiff's failure to offer evidence that locations 
other than his office triggered his symptoms. Id at 482-85 . 
. L 
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language in Toyota Motor Manufactwing Kentucky, Inc. v. vf!illimns, 
observing that the ADA requires plaintiffs to offer evidence of 
disability ·"'in tenns oftheir OJil'lll expenemce,"'113 the panel concluded: 
"Whatever the comparative credibility of medical versus personal 
testimony, a plaintiff's personal testimony cannot be inadequate to 
raise a genuine issue regarding his 'own experience."' 114 
The Ninth Circuit's Head decision follows a similar logic but 
provides a somewhat more detailed discussion of the issue. 115 The trial 
court granted partial summary judgment for the defendant on the basis 
of the plaintiff's failure to present medical evidence in support of his 
claim that he was disabled due to depression and bipolar disorder. 116 
The plaintiff had provided a detailed affidavit describing the impact of 
these conditions on his ability to sleep, interact with others, read, and 
think.117 On appeal, the panel stated unequivocally: 
We hold that Ninth Circuit precedent does· not require comparative or 
medical evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
the impairment of a major life activity at the summary judgment stage. 
Rather, our precedent supports the principle that a plaintiff's testimony 
may suffice to establish a genuine issue of materialfact. 118 
The appeals qourt also emphasized; however, that supporting 
affidavits ''must not be merely self-serving and must contain sufficient 
detail to convey the existence of an impairment."119 
A separate approach, somewhat related to this nonmandatory 
view, followed by a few courts in ADA cases, is to take judicial notice 
of certain medical facts, such as whether a condition is an 
"impairment" or substantially limiting, rather than requiring a plaintiff 
to provide expert medical testimony on such facts. 120 In these cases, 
judicial notice substitutes for a physician's testimony, records, or 
affidavit regarding a plaintiff's condition. 121 Thus, while the courts 
113. Jd at 482 (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 
(2002)). 
114. ld 
115. See Head v. GlacierNw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2005). 
116. Jd at 1057. 
117. Jd at 1059-62. 
118. ld at 1058. 
119. Jd at 1059. 
120. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b) (''A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."). 
121. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Tampa, 998 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (M.D. Fla. 1998) 
(holding that the plaintiff's deposition testimony, together with the relevant excerpts from 
-------·--~----
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consider some medical facts to be important to the determination of 
disability, they do not require plaintiffs to procure expert testimony 
Tegarding their specific conditions. 122 As_ these cases demonstrate, it 
would seem appropriate and efficient that with respect to certain well­
settled medical information, and at least for summary judgment 
purposes (leaving it to the plaintiff to determine whether she wishes to 
present a live witness to explain such information to the jury), a court 
should take judicial notice of medical information contained within 
indisputably authoritative texts123 such as the Merck Manual. 124 The 
summary judgment record on the issue of whether a plaintiff met the 
definition of disability would thus contain the plaintiff's testimony of 
her condition and its impact on her major life activities, supplemented 
by explanations provided in medical references identified by the 
plaintiff or by the court itself 125 
The judicial notice approach would, of course, not satisfy many 
courts, particularly those following the lead of the Second Circuit, 
which requires expert medical testimony to confirm a plaintiff's 
specific description of a medical condition and the resulting 
limitations.126 In other words, medical texts cannot provide testimony 
regarding the validity and veracity of an individual's specific claims of 
authoritative medical texts, were enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether that condition substantially limited her major life activities). 
122. See Harris v. H&W Contracting Co., 102 R3d 516,522-23 (11th Cir.l996) 
(citing THE MERCK MANuAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1038-39 (Robert Berkow et al. eds., 
15th ed. 1987)); Wrjght, 998 R Supp. at 1402. 
123. C£ Sheehan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 368 F. Supp. 2d 228, 242 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(noting that pursuant to Rule 20l(b), a court may take judicial notice of "generally known 
clinical definitions" such as those found on the website for the American Heart Association). 
124. THE MERCK MANuAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY (Robert Berkow et al. eds., 
18th ed. 2006). 
125. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reliance in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 
624 (1998), upon medical literature (without making explicit reference to employing judicial 
notice) regarding HN infection to support a . finding that the plaintiff was substantially 
limited in the rnajor life activity of reproduction, see supra note 65. 
Bankruptcy courts frequently take judicial notice regarding medical information in cases 
in which a debtor is seeking a discharge of an educational loan on the basis of "undue 
hardship;' 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007), and specifically on the basis 
of a disability. The conditions include multiple sclerosis, attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, glaucoma, and bipolar disorder, and courts have relied upon a number of different 
sources for the information. See Hertzel v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 329 B.R. 221, 230-33 
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2005) (stating that in order to prove "undue hardship" some corroborative 
evidence ofplaintiff's condition was necessary). 
126. See, e.g., Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to 
submit admissible medical evidence of an impairment that substantially limits a major life 
activity). · 
___.e ··--··---·--·-·---·---- -----------------------------~----
30 TULANE LAWREVIEW [Vol. 82:1 
disability. However, as explored below, these courts' insistence on 

. corroborating medical evidence as a prerequisite to establishing 

disability is contrary to the application of summary judgment 

principles, as outlined by the Supreme Court and is based upon 

misplaced concerns regarding ADA plaintiffs' motives. 
N. 	 THE STATED RATIONALE OF THE REQUIREMENT OF MEDICAL 

EVIDENCE-JUDGES' IMPROPER INSISTENCE ON 

"CORROBORATION" OF PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENTS 

Judges' insistence on the presence of expert medical testimony in 
the record is based upon improper reasoning and imposes an 
unwarranted and inappropriate burden on ADA plaintiffs. More is at 
stake in these cases than just the practical lesson that when faced with 
a defendant's summary judgment motion, a plaintiff's attorney should 
be sure to obtain an affidavit from a doctor that supports her client's 
allegations of impairment and resulting limitations. 127 The approaches 
followed by courts requiring such evidence superimpose requirements 
on ADA plaintiffs that have no basis in the statute itself and misapply 
the core principles of summary judgment analysis. 
Many court decisions explicitly refer to the inadequacy of a 
plaintiff's "self-serving" affidavit or deposition testimony standing 
alone to establish disability and the corresponding necessity ofmedical 
evidence to corroborate or support a plaintiff's assertions of 
disability.128 These decisions do not suggest that a plaintiff cannot offer 
evidence of a disability in opposition to a summary judgment motion, 
but, rather, state that such evidence will be insufficient as a matter of 
law to establish a prima facie case unless it is also accompanied by 
evidence from a physician validating what she professes to be her 
127. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: My Are So 
Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better 
Before a Jury? A Response to Professor Calker, 19 REv. LITIG. 505, 523 (2000). In the 
authors' view, the failure to produce sufficient medical evidence and pursuing only one type 
ofADA claim are strategic errors on the part of plaintiffs' attorneys. ld 
128. See, e.g., LaBrecque v. Sodexho USA, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 100, 109-10 (D. 
Mass. 2003) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff's 
assertions of disability were corroborated by medical records); Baerga v. Hosp. for Special 
Surgery, No. 97 Civ.0230(DAB), 2003 WL 22251294, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) 
(granting defendant's motion for surnmaiy judgment where plaintiff offered only self-serving 
uncorroborated testimony about the impact of her medical conditions on the major life 
activity of sleeping); cf. Reynolds v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., No. 1:02-1 039-CV-JDT-TAB, 2003 
WL 23220760, at *5, (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13, 2003) (requiring some corroborating evidence of 
disability but not medical evidence per se); Martyne v. Parkside Med. Servs., No. 97 C 8295, 
2000 WL 748096, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2000) (stating that objective evidence is needed to 
prove a disability under the ADA, but that medical evidence is not required in every case). 
.! 
~ 
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disability.129 Other courts characterize the evidentiary failing of a 
plaintiff's claim as being a lack of "objective" evidence of disability, 
and that such evidence is needed to corroborate a plaintiff's description 
of a substantially limiting impairment. 130 Many courts hold that 
medical evidence is required where a plaintiff's condition is not one 
that the jury can readily assess without having to rely solely upon a 
plaintiff's subjective description of the impairment and the resulting 
limitations. 131 Thus, the notion of "obviousness" of disability is also 
tied to the issue of corroboration. However characterized, none of the 
courts' explanations for the requirement of medical evidence to 
establish disability withstands close analysis. 
A. 	 CourtDecisions Improperly Import the Substantive Law ofOther 
Causes ofAction To Hold ThatPlaintiffs' Testimony Alone is 
Insufficient To Establish Disability Under the ADA 
The court opinions holding that "self-serving" statements of a 
plaintiff alone are insufficient as a matter of law to establish a genuine 
issue of material fact often base such holdings upon non-ADA case 
law that appears to require corroborating evidence of a plaintiff's 
claims.132 An examination of the issues presented in the precedents 
129. This question is very different from that discussed below regarding who is . 
competent to offer testimony on medical conditions. See inita notes 303-332 and 
accompanying text. 
130. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. C 95-1658 FMS, 1996 WL 
723089, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1996) ("Plaintiff failed to produce any objective medical 
evidence demonstrating a restriction of either his short or long term work capacity in any 
job."); Farley v. Gibson Container, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 322, 326 (N.D. Miss. 1995) ("He has 
presented absolutely no medical reports or other objective evidence substantiating his claim 
that his injury and subsequent surgery left him with a condition which rises to the level of a 
physical impairment."). 
131. See, e.g., Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996) (heart condition); 
Brandon v. Klingensmith Healthcare, Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-1963, 2005 WL 3434141, at *5 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005) (fibromyalgia); Ashton v. AT & T Corp., No. Civ.A.03­
CV3158(DMC), 2005 WL 2320899, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2005) (anxiety and agoraphobia); 
Lakota v. Soncoco Prods. Co., No. Civ.A. 00-30219-FHF, 2002 WL 596211, at *3 (D. Mass. 
Apr. 4, 2002) (deep vein thrombosis); Dorn v. Potter, 191 F. Supp. 2d 612, 623 (WD. Pa. 
2002) (learning disorder). 
132. See, e.g., Baerga, 2003 WL 22251294, at *5 ("Plaintiff offers only self-serving, 
uncorroborated statements to support his contention that his panic disorder substantially 
limits his ability to sleep, think and interact with others."); Dam, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 623 
(holding that a plaintiff's own self-serving evidence was not enough to show that he was 
substantially limited in a major life activity when the alleged acts of discrimination occurred); 
Cardwell v. Bd. ofEduc., No. OOC7147, 2001 WL 1064334, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2001) 
(granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to submit 
any corroborating evidence, other than his own self-serving affidavit, to prove his substantial 
limitation of a major life activity). 
----- -----------------------·-· 
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themselves, however, demonstrates that this use is misplaced. To begin 
with, any evidence offered by a plaintiff, whether in affidavit, 
deposition, or otherwise, in support of her claim is, by ddinition, self­
serving to at least some extent. 133 But that does not render the evidence 
necessarily defective or inadmissible. While historically, a party to a 
civil matter was not competent to provide testimony in his or her own 
case, that rule was eventually abolished in English common law and 
has no basis in modem American jurisprudence. 134 Similarly, the 
ancient legal principle of testis unus-testis nullus (one witness-no 
witness), which states that a single witness is effectively no witness at 
all for purposes of proving a fact in court proceedings, has been long 
abandoned.135 
Rather, under contemporary American law, for purposes of both 
summary judgment and trial, an individual witness's account 
(including that of the plaintiff who has a direct financial stake in the 
133. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGI;ISH LANGUAGE 1581 (4th ed. 
2000), defines self-serving as follows: "1. Serving one's own interests, especially without 
concern for the needs or interests of others. 2. Exhibiting concern solely for one's own 
interests: a speech :fiiJJ ofself-serving comments." · 
134. The Supreme Court described the abolition of this rule in Ferguson v. Georgia, 
365 U.S. 570,573-77 (1961). The Court noted that: 
The disqualification of parties as witnesses characterized the common law for 
centuries. Wigmore traces its remote origins to the contest for judicial hegemony 
between the developing jury trial and the older modes of trial, notably 
compurgation and wager of law. Under those old forms, the oath itself was a 
means of decision. Jury trial replaced decision by oath with decision of the jurors 
based on the evidence of witnesses; with this change "[T]he party was naturally 
deemed incapable of being such a witness." Incompetency of the parties in civil 
cases seems to have been established by the end of the sixteenth century. In time 
the principal rationale of the rule became the possible untrustworthiness of the 
party's testimony; for the same reason disqualification was applied in the 
seventeenth century to interested nonparty witnesses. 
Jd at 573 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
135. See In re Roe's Will, 143 N.Y.S. 999, 1003 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1913) ("In old 
testamentary law and in the Ecclesiastical Courts one witness was no witness, 'testis unus, 
testis nullus,' or, as the jurist Loysel said, 'The voice of one is the voice of none.' This rule of 
Hebraic origin dominated the whole procedure of the Middle Ages, and was very potent in 
the canon Law and in the Ecclesiastical Courts of England."); see also Lawrence Douglas, 
Wartilne Lies: Seeming The Holocaust in Law and Literature, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 367, 
386 (1995) ('The medieval canonical stricture of testis unus, testis nullus (one witness, no 
witness), though formally abandoned in modem rules of evidence, suggests an attitude that 
continues to inform contemporary jurisprudence, one that enfolds· all testimony in 
suspicion."); Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value ofFace-to-Face Con:ITontations, 40 U. FLA. 
L. REv. 863, 912 n.l63 (1988) ("Sir William Holdsworth observed that during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, English law required evidence of two witnesses for a conviction of 
some offenses. This rule of 'testis unus testis nullus,' however, had a relatively small effect on 
modem English law. The .result was an emphasis on the proper weight ofthe evidence rather 
than the number of witnesses who swore to a fact." (citations omitted)). 
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account) may be sufficient to support .a finding against the defendant 
assuming that the witness can present admissible testimony on each 
element of the claim. 136 In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that summary judgment is appropriate only where a party 
who will have the burden of proof at trial "fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party's case."137 In other words, there must be "a complete failure of 
proof" concerning such an essential element. 138 Reference to the 
inadequacy of "self-serving" testimony is only appropriate in cases 
where, for example, the plaintiff is making conclusory statements 
concerning a defendant's motives, where a specific motive comprises 
one of the necessary elements of a claim as a matter of substantive law, 
without any actual evidence of such motives. 139 Another way of stating 
the infirmity of the testimony is that the plaintiff has no personal 
knowledge of the facts asserted (such as a defendant's belief and 
intent), and, therefore, the proffered affidavit or deposition testimony 
does not "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence."140 
Specifically, such speculative assertions would be the appropriate basis 
to sustain a defendant's trial objection raised under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 602. 141 Thus, the shortcoming of such proffered evidence is 
not that it is a statement by aplaintiffin support of her own claim, but 
that a plaintiff is trying to win a case by offering nothing more than her 
own interpretation of events, includillg the allegedly impermissible and 
undisclosed motives of others. 142 
136. See C. A. J. COADY, TESTIMONY: APIDLOSOPIDCALSTUDY 34 (1992) ("Corrobora­
tion has an important role in the assessment of testimony but in modem English law 
uncorroborated testimony is perfectly acceptable as evidence, except for some categories of 
witness (such as unsworn children). This was not always so in English law nor is it so today 
in Scottish law and canon law where the tradition of Roman law is strong and the maxim 
testis unis, [sic} testis nullus is the rule."). 
137. 477 u.s. 317,322 (1986). 
138. ld at 323. 
139. See, e.g., Santiago v. Canon U.S.A.; Inc., 138 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998) ("'A 
plaintiff [claiming discrimination] "may not prevail simply by asserting an inequity and 
tacking on the self-serving conclusion that the defendant was motivated by a discriminatory 
animus.""') (quoting Coyne 'v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 444 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
140. FED.R.Crv.P. 56(e). 
141. FED. R. Evro. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the 
matter.'-'). 
142. See Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 
2000) ("[A] 'party's own affidavit, containing relevant information of which he has first-hand 
knowledge, may be self-serving, but it is nonetheless competent to support or defeat 
summary judgment."' (quoting Cadle Co. v. Haynes, 116 F.3d 957,961 n.5 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
--- - --- ----- -- __ 
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This :important distinction, however, is lost in the application of 
this case law to require the use of corroborating medical evidence to 
support a plaintiff's claim of actual disability under the ADA, to which 
a defendant's beliefs and motives are wholly irrelevant. An example of 
this misplaced use ofprecedent is a decision ofthe United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, McPhaul v. Board of 
Commissioners. 143 The panel affirmed the entry of summary judgment 
for the employer-defendant on an ADA claim brought by a woman 
who claimed that she was entitled to reasonable accommodation by her 
employer for her fibromyalgia. 144 The plaintiff presented evidence that 
her symptoms included "fatigue, insomnia, shortness of breath and 
muscle pain, including sore hands and joints" and "that her condition 
made it difficult for her to concentrate, bathe, walk, write and work." 145 
The panel noted the absence of medical evidence regarding the 
potential benefits of the requested accommodations and that "[a]ll that 
McPhaul can present in support of her reasonable accommodation 
claim is her own self-serving testimony, and in this case, that is just not 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that she is a qualified individual 
with a disability under the ADA."146 The authority offered for that 
holding was an earlier decision by that court, Slowiak v. Land 
0 'Lake~ Inc.,. which held that "[s ]elf-serving affidavits without factual 
support in the record will not · defeat a motion for summary 
judgment."147 However, the earlier quote arose in an antitrust case 
alleging price fixing, a completely different context in which a plaintiff 
is required to offer admissible evidence of the defendant's alleged 
conspiracy to set prices to establish one ofthe elements ofthe claim. 148 
Thus, the question of whether evidence in the record beyond the 
statements of a plaintiff is required to create a genuine issue of 
material fact turns upon the substantive law of the plaintiff's particular 
claims-either as set forth by statute or developed through case law­
143. 226 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2000). 
144. ld at 562,-564. 
145. Id at 562. 
146. Id at 564. The McPhaulcase is one ofthe few considered in this Article in which 
the failure to include medical evidence in the record is specifically noted with respect to the 
question of reasonable accommodation, in addition to meeting the definition of disability. 
See id The appellate panel noted the absence of corroborating medical evidence with respect 
to both issues. ld at 563-64. 
147. 987 F.2d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1993). 
148. Id at 1295-97. The panel followed the admonition against "self-serving" 
statements standing alone with a quote from another decision: '"[A] plaintiff's speculation is 
not a sufficient defense to a summary judgment motion."' Id at 1295 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 337 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
------------·--···--------------·-·-·----..-·-------·--------'--........... . 
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not on the general procedural rules regarding summary judgment. In 
contrast to the antitrust laws at issue in Slowiak, the ADA definition of 
disability under the "actual disability" category requires no evidence 
beyond that which would be lmown firsthand by the plaintiff. 149 Nor is 
there any basis in the ADA text or regulations, discussed above, 150 to 
require corroboration of any fact within a plaintiff's own lmowledge in 
order to survive summary judgment. 151 The distinction is between 
testifying about the "self," as noted by the D.C. Circuit in Haynes v. 
Williams, and making speculative assertions about others' motives 
("He fired me because I'm deaf") and actions. 152 
B. 	 The Requirement ofCorroborating Medical Evidence Runs 
Contrary to Swnmary Judgment Principles Regarding Credibility 
Detenninations 
The decisions based upon the inadequacy of "self..,serving". 
testimony of facts within one's own lmowledge and experience are not 
only incorrect as a matter of substantive law but are als.o entirely 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent on the proper approach to 
issues of credibility presented in a motion for summary judgment. In 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., another case in the 1986 Celotex 
trilogy of cases on summary judgment, the Court held: "'[A]ll that is 
required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual 
dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' 
differing versions of the truth at trial."'153 The Court stressed that "at 
the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to 
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to 
.determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."154 Accordingly, 
the Court noted: 
Credibility detemrinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the 
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not 
those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary 
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000)_. In contrast, some evidence of an employer's 
subjective belief would be required in cases brought by plaintiffs who allege that they were 
subjected to discrimination based upon a record of disability or perceived disability. See 
Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1230 (11th Cir. 1999). 
150. 	 See supra notes 12-72 and accompanying text. 
151. See American with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified in scattered sections of29, 42,47 U.S.C.); 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2007). 
152. 	 392 F.3d 478,482 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
153. 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (quoting First Nat'! Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 
391 u.s. 253,288-89 (1968)). 
154. 	 Id 
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judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence ofthe nonmovant is to 
be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. 155 
Accordingly, assuming that in resisting summary judgment an ADA 
plaintiff offers admissible evidence156 describing an impairment that 
substantially limits her in one or more major life activities, no further 
analysis is needed of whether the plaintiff has satisfied the definition 
of disability for summary judgment purposes. 
Indeed, this was precisely the analysis followed in both the 
Haynes and Head opinions. However, by requiring expert medical 
evidence in addition to a plaintiff's own statements, other courts have 
improperly blurred the important line-emphasized repeatedly by the 
· Supreme Court-between providing sufficient evidence and providing 
persuasive evidence.157 There is a distinction between the problem of 
conclusory, nonspecific evidence, which is not sufficient to create an 
issue of fact, and "self-serving" or uncorroborated evidence, which is 
merely potentially (but not necessarily) unconvincing evidence. If a 
plaintiff does not offer expert medical testimony regarding disability at 
trial, then she perhaps runs the risk ofnot persuading the jury that she 
is disabled. But, as the decisions of the Celotex trilogy and their 
progeny make clear, the role of the trial coun at summary judgment is 
not to engage in such weighing ofthe evidence but only to determine if 
there is sufficient evidence upon which a jury couldbase a verdict. 158 
Judges' improper approach to summary judgment in ADA cases 
stands in marked contrast to the case law of the Rehabilitation Act, 
under which federal courts routinely reserved factual issues regarding 
whether a plaintiff was disabled for juries. 159 The Supreme Court 
specifically noted in School Board v. Arline that the issue of whether 
an individual was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation 
Act was a factual, not legal, question. 160 Under the ADA, however, 
'judges are routinely deciding fact-intensive cases without sending 
155. • ld at 255 (emphasis added). 
156. See in:ITa notes 260-332 and accompanying text for a discussion of the special 
issues involving admissibility. 
157. See, e.g., In re Estate of Swan, 293 P.2d 682, 689 (Utah 1956) (stating that a 
party's burden of persuasion is to convince the fact finder that the evidence is in his favor, 
while to meet its burden ofproduction, the party only needs to make a prima facie showing of 
the facts). 
158. · SeeCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322-23 (1986). 
159. See Colker, Windfall, supra note 73, at 111-12 (stating that under the 
Rehabilitation Act, juries determined whether someone was disabled and Congress therefore 
intended juries to have the same role under the ADA). 
160. 480 u.s. 273,287 (1987). 
I 
I 
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· them to the jury."161 Professor Ruth Golker's analysis of outcomes in 
ADA employment discrimination cases revealed that over 93% of 
reported decisions yielded results that are favorable · for the 
defendant. 162 She concluded that "the summary judgment tool was a 
device used with great frequency at the trial court level to dispose of 
ADA cases in favor of defendants,"163 and attributed the bulk ofADA 
decisions unfavorable to the plaintiff as being evidence of courts 
"abusing the summary judgment device by creating an impossibly 
high threshold of proof" for ADA plaintiffs to survive summary 
judgment.164 Courts' improper requirement of medical evidence at the 
summary judgment stage serves as one of the most significant causes 
ofthese lopsided results. 
Indeed, imposing a demanding evidentiary standard of 
"corroborating" evidence in ADA claims is inconsistent with the 
approach taken in other antidiscrimination statutes, such as the 
prohibition on religious discrimination found in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which, like the ADA, requires certain reasonable 
accommodations in the employment setting. 165 As part of a prima facie 
case alleging an employer's failure to reasonably accommodate a 
161. Colker, Windfall, supmnote 73, at 116. 
162. See id at 126. 
163. Id 
164. CaLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supm note 73, at 115. As a side note, this 
discussion takes place with a backdrop of a broader question about summary judgment in the 
federal courts, particularly in' civil rights litigation, which has been the focus of much recent 
commentary. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication 
Principles in Disparate Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REv. 103, 105-106 (2005) (arguing that 
federal courts have failed to adhere to the principle that summary judgment is not appropriate 
when a plaintiff's employment discrimination case is "weak but winnable"); Arthur R. Miller, 
The Pretrial Rush to Judgment· Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and 
Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 982, 984-85 (2003) (arguing that courts have extended the use of summary judgment 
and the motion to dismiss to resolve disputes that are better left to trial and the jury); Martin 
H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the. Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation 
Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1329, 1348 (2005) (arguing that changes in the law of summary 
judgment have led to a decrease in federal trials). One comin.entator referred to summary 
judgment as the "new fulcrum of federal civil dispute resolution." Paul W. Mollica, Federal 
Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 141, 141 (2000). Two recent essays 
offer provocative arguments in favor ofthe wholesale elimination of summary judgment. See 
John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522, 522, 526-27 
(2007) (arguing that abolishing summary judgment would make court systems fairer and 
more efficient); Suja A Thomas, My Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. 
REv. 139, 140 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is unconstitutional because it denies a 
party his or her Seventh Arnendnlent right to a trial by jury). 
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000eG), 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000). 
---~--
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religious practice, a plaintiff must establish the "sincerity" of her bona 
fide religious views. 166 As one court explained: 
In order to satisfy this element, the plaintiff must demonstrate both that 
the belief or practice is religious and that it is sincerely held .... 
. . . The element of sincerity is fundamental, since "if the religious 
beliefs that apparently prompted a request are not sincerely held, there 
has been no showing of a religious observance or practice that conflicts 
with an employment requirement." 167 
Thus, the required showing is in many ways analogous to meeting the 
definition of disability in a claim for a reasonable accommodation 
under the ADA. 
However, the two protected categories receive vastly different 
treatment in terms of required evidence to establish a prima facie 
claim. Employee-plaintiffs are not required to provide proof of 
religion, beyond their own statements, to establish the sincerity of their 
beliefs.168 Courts consistently hold: 
The finding on this issue [of sincerity] generally will depend on the 
factfinder's assessment of the employee's credibility. Credibility issues 
such as the sincerity of an employee's religious belief are quintessential 
fact questions. As such, they ordinanly shoUld be reserved "for the 
factfinder at tdal, not for the court at summaryjudgment"169 ·• 
Further, there is no requirement for a sworn statement or other 
evidence from a clergyperson or other individual attesting to the 
frequency of attendance at worship services or other "objective" 
indicators of sincerity.170 No doubt, such evidence would bolster a 
plaintiff's claims and would perhaps make the difference at trial 
between whether the fact finder does or does not believe her sincerity. 
But courts properly reserve that question for fact finders. 
There is no reason why claims of reasonable accommodation on 
the basis of disability should_ be subjected to any different treatment. 
166. EEOC v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad, 279 R3d 49, 55-56 (1st Cir. 
2002). 
167. Jd at 56 (quoting EEOC v. Ilona ofHungary, Inc., 108 R3d 1569, 1575 (7th Cir. 
1997)). 
168. See id. (stating that the determination of whether a religious belief is sincerely 
held is generally an issue ofthe employee's credibility for the fact finder to determine). 
169. Jd (quoting Simas v. First Citizen's Fed. Credit Union, 170 R3d 37, 49 (1st Cir. 
1999)) (other citations omitted) (emphasis added); see Ilona ofHungary, 108 R3d at 1575. 
170. Cf. Tiano v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 R3d 679, 682-83 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case of sincerity of belief that she 
needed to undertake a pilgrimage at a specific time because of the absence of specific 
statements in her own testimony regarding the "temporal mandate" ofthe pilgrimage). 
-·~--~~~-~~---·-------------------~----------· -···----------···--·--------~~---------------------~~-
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One reaction to this view might be that religion is different in that 
employers (and courts) must be careful not to invade the privacy of 
one's religious practice by involving a clergyperson or others in the 
inquiry. But why should the privacy, and most particularly the medical 
privacy, of people with disabilities be any <llfferent? The different 
attitudes toward proving disability versus religion suggest that courts 
(and therefore society) have more concern about people who falsely 
"claim disability" than those who falsely claim to ha:ve a particular 
belief. Religious individuals are perhaps regarded more like "normal" 
people and are not associated with those who seek government support 
or workers' compensation or similar claims. Thus, we do not generally 
question their credibility. But a potential plaintiff's incentive to 
deceive is identical in any kind of reasonable accommodation claim, 
and the respective roles of the court and the jury in determining the 
veracity of a plaintiff's claims should be consistent as wel1. 171 
171. As a final note for purposes of the analysis offered here, it should be 
aclmowledged that in some ofthe opinions reviewed in Part III, it is difficult to determine the 
specific failing in terms of the sufficiency of the evidence. It may well have been that the 
only testimony offered was a single-line affidavit to the effect of "I have __ and it 
substantially limits me in the daily activity of'--'" with nothing more. While an argument 
could. be made that nothing in the ADA requires extensive, detailed testimony about 
disability, there is clear consensus of the courts, relying in large part on the EEOC's 
regulations and other interpretive materials regarding the need for individualized assessment 
of disability, that some description of an impairment and resulting limitations is needed to 
establish disability. See Feldblum, supra note 33, at 158-59. This is the case despite the fact 
that under the case law developed with the use of the identical definition of disability under 
the Rehabilitation Act, such assertions likely would have been accepted on all sides as 
sufficient to establish disability. See id at 106 ("[C]ourts hearing Section 504 cases rarely 
tarried long on the question ofwhether a plaintiff was 'really a handicapped individual."'). 
Thus, in some cases, there may be an overall paucity of specific evidence of a disability, 
and the problem lies with the content (or lack thereof) ofthe plaintiff's statements-that they 
were conclusory and not sufficiently specific-and not necessarily the absence of medical 
evidence. In other words, there may be certain cases where, if the plaintiff had offered more 
detailed admissible evidence of the effects of an impairrllent or a substantial limitation of a 
major life activity, the absence of medical evidence should not have been fatal or perhaps 
even noteworthy. Furthermore, an outcome could also depend upon whether the absence of 
detailed evidence was raised in a defendant's summary judgment briefing. In many such· 
cases, courts invoke an oft-cited mandate that mere evidence of a diagnosis is insufficient to 
establish disability. One example is Machin-Rodn"guez v. C & C Partnership Cpca. Cola 
Puerto Rico, where the plaiittiff alleged that he was disabled due to depression. No. Civ.03­
1746 SEC, 2005 WL 2293574, at *1 (D.P.R. Sept. 20, 2005). The district court noted, in 
addition to the inadequacy of the medical evidence provided (which "simply states his 
diagnosis and treatment"), the failure of the plaintiff's affidavit "to describe or provide any 
specific information on the effects, let alone the 'substantial' effects, that his diagnosis has or 
has had on his major life activities." ld at *4; accord Burks v. Wise. Dep't ofTransp., 464 
F.3d 744, 756-57 (7th Cir. 2006); Stein v. Ashcroft, 284 F.3d 721, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Cook v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, No. 03 Civ.3926LAKFM, 2005 WL 2429422, at *12 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005); Dom v. Potter, 191 F. Supp. 2d 612, 622 (WD. Pa. 2002); 
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As demonstrated above, there are a significant number of cases in 
which, despite a plaintiff's detailed testimony or affidavit regarding a 
medical condition and its impact on her life, a court has found such 
evidence insufficient as a matter of law to generate a genuine issue of 
material fact. 172 Such decisions demonstrate a fundamental 
misapplication of the ADA and the rules of summary judgment. 
Indeed, in few ofthe cases cited or discussed in Part III do the courts in 
fact engage in an analysis of the proper approach to summary 
judgment on questions of disability under the ADA. Rather, they 
merely cite to one (or several) of the earlier cases that impose the 
medical evidence requirement, as if it were a matter of settled ADA 
jurisprudence.173 The result is the creation of a significant body of case 
law, based upon a wholly erroneous rationale, which has been used to 
block numerous ADA plaintiffs' claims from proceeding to trial. 
V. 	 THE UNSTATED RATIONALE-THE PHYSICIAN AS GATEKEEPER 
AGAINST MALINGERING 
If requiring medical evidence to corroborate a plaintiff's 
allegation that she is disabled has. no basis in the statute's text and is at 
stark variance with proper summary judgment practice, as explained in . 
the preceding Part, why are courts imposing this additional evidentiary 
burden on ADA plaintiffs specifically? The reasons likely stem from a 
common ongm: namely, courts' concern that those "claiming 
disability" may be malingering by exaggerating or even inventing the 
claimed disability. 174 This preoccupation with malingering is revealed 
Charlotten v. May Dep't Stores Co., No. 97 Civ.8962(HB), 1998 WL 635547, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 16, 1998); Ivaniuc v. Hauer Knitting Mills, Inc., No. 94 CV 5909(SJ), 1998 WL 57077, 
at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1998). Courts are ·not always careful to note the important 
distinction between the quantum ofevidence ofdisability and the quality ofsuch evidence. 
172. See, e.g., Brandon v. Klingensmith Healthcare, Inc., No. Civ.A.03-1963, 2005 
WL 3434141, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005) (granting the defendant~s motion for 
summary judgment despite the plaintiff'S' detailed answers to interrogatories describing how 
her daily life was affected by her fibromyalgia); Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 R Supp. 
2d 379, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
because the only medical evidence that the plaintiff presented of his disability was two 
unsworn and inadmissible letters from physicians); supnmotes 82-87 and accompanying text. 
173. See, e.g., Douglas, 21 R Supp. 2d at 392 (citing several decisions requiring the 
plaintiff to produce medical evidence ofa disability). 
174. Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos has suggested that a preoccupation with feigned 
disability may be behind lower courts' use of the term "truly disabled" when ruling against 
plaintiffs deemed to fall outside that category. Bagenstos, supra note 38, at 469-70. Indeed, 
such concern may serve as the source for many overly restrictive interpretations ofthe statute, 
as well as for the improper imposition ofevidentiary requirements, as is argued here. 
~ 
------------------------------------~' 
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by courts' persistence in assigning physicians the role of screening out 
specious claims of disability. 175 
Courts that require expert medical testimony as part of a prima 
facie case are essentially delegating credibility determinations to 
physicians.176 If there is no corroboration of a plaintiff's own 
description of her disability, then these courts assume the plaintiff's 
assertions of limitations may be discounted to the point that they are 
effectively nonexistent. 177 Further, if a plaintiff's accounting of her 
disability is at variance with what is described by her physician, this is 
not seen as a disputed issue of fact-thus a credibility determination to 
be resolved at trial by the jury-but as a failure to satisfy the 
requirements for a prima facie case. 178 It is as if she offered no 
testimony at all. A treating physician's deposition testimony (in 
response to questions posed' by the defendant's attorney, most likely) 
may include statements to the effect that the physician is aware of no 
reason why the plaintiff could not work or perform the major life 
activity that the plaintiff alleges to be impaired. 179 For example, in 
Baerga v. Hospital for Special Surgery, the trial court noted that 
although the plaintiff alleged to have difficulty sleeping, there was no 
175. See, e.g., Sussle v. Sirina Protection Sys. Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 285, 302 
(S.D.N.Y 2003) (holding that a plaintiff needs medical evidence to prove that he is disabled 
for purposes oftheADA). 
176. In other contexts, courts generally exclude expert testimony where the primary 
purpose of such evidence is to bolster the credibility of a witness. See DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., 
THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE§ 1.5, at 23-24 (2004) 
(noting that federal courts often rely upon the "helpfulness criterion of Rule 702" to exclude 
expert testimony on credibility); Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation 
of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W REs. L. REv. 165, 166 (1989) ("Jurors are expected to 
make credibility decisions based on their common sense, which is also termed intuition or 
experience. This concept of common sense is considered essential to the jury's task. When 
jurors exercise· their common sense in evaluating a witness' testimony, a full and fair 
credibility determination is presumed to follow. Special assistance from a judge or expert, 
therefore, would be superfluous and invade the exclusive province of the jury." (footnotes 
omitted)). 
177. See, e.g., Baerga v.Hosp. for Special Surgery, No. 97 Civ.0230(DAB), 2003 WL 
2225129l:J., at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) (finding that the plaintiff's testimony was .self­
serving and uncorroborated). 
178. See, e.g., Crume! v. Hampton Univ., No. Civ.A. 4:05CV31, 2005 WL 3357315, at 
*7 (B.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2005) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to show that he was 
substantially limited in the major life activity of breathing where his medical records, 
submitted in support of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, conflicted with his 
own "self-serving" affidavit regarding the extent of his allergy symptoms as he had "not 
provided sufficient evidence to refute the medical evidence"). 
179. See, e.g., Lakota v. Sonoco Prods. Co., No. Civ. A.00-30219-FHF, 2002 WL 
596211, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 4, 2002) (noting that the plaintiff's treating physician never 
regarded the plaintiff's deep vein thrombosis to be severe enough to recommend a medical 
leave ofabsence). 
--------~-----·-------~---· 
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mention of such limitation in a psychiatric evaluation included in the 
record. 180 Therefore, in the court's view, notwithstanding his own 
testimony on the issue, the plaintiff failed to establish that he had a 
substantial limitation in the major life activity of sleeping. 181 
Casting doubt on the credibility of those claiming "disability" is 
not limited to the case law of the ADA, and the notion of disability as 
essentially and exclusively a medical phenomenon is tied to such 
skepticism. 182 As the political scientist Deborah Stone explains: 
People could either be truly injured or feign injury. In the modern 

understanding of disability, deception has become part and parcel ofthe 

concept itself, and the nature of this deception is tied to the particular 

form of validation used to detect it. The definition ofdisability and the 

means to detennine itbecame cdtically linked 183 · 

We require a doctor's note for absence from work or school and 
medical documentation in numerous other contexts. Indeed, the 
requirement of providing such documentation is done so frequently as 
to not be questioned. 
Thus, the ADA's enactment in 1990 simply created another forum 
for this fear of deception to emerge. Such skepticism has been and 
remains directed at the entire class of people who self-identify as 
disabled. The prior case law developed under federal disability 
benefits programs, with its explicit requirement ofmedical evidence to 
corroborate claims, compounded the prob1em. 184 Society has 
embraced medicine as the only reliable means to weed out the. 
nefarious it).dividuals who seemingly exploit the opportunity to gain 
some advantage by claiming disability. These three interrelated factors 
have converged to create a judicial culture, successfully exploited by 
defendants' attorneys, ·under which ADA claims of disability are 
subjected to unwarranted evidentiary requirements. 
·' 
180. 2003 WL 22251294, at *5. 
181. Id at *6; accord Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.3d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(noting that while the plaintiff alleged that his depression led to, among other things, "severe 
pressure on his brain" and an inability to eat, the medical evidence "reveals" that he had never 
reported those particular symptoms to his physician). 
182. See STONE, supnz note 42, at 28. 
183. Id (emphasis added). 
184. See in!Ta notes 206-230 and accompanying text. 
'·· ~
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A. Malingering and the ADA 
Much of the anti-ADA sentiment expressed in the popular 
discourse reflects a suspicion of those who "claim disability." 185 As 
· Professor Calker noted· in 1999, the popular media reflected a false 
perception that the ADA was a "windfall statute for plainti:ffs." 186 One 
magazine columnist referred to the ADA as creating "'a lifelong buffet 
of perks, special breaks and procedural protections' for people with 
questionable disabilities."187 Journalist Mary Johnson documented 
numerous examples of virulent negative (and quite frequently false) 
portrayals of the ADA in mainstream media and notes that much of it 
was directed against the perceived "fakers."188 Indeed, there was a 
specific discussion in Congress of ways to structure the 
implementation of the ADA so as to "eliminate any potential for 
abuse" by those asserting rights under the statute. 189 
The public criticisms of the ADA reveal a recurring theme of 
skepticism and distrust directed by the public against those ·asserting 
their rights under the statute. One judge acknowledged public remarks 
made in 1995 by the President ofBoston University, Jon Westling, in a 
lawsuit brought by Boston University students with learning 
disabilities: 
"[T]he . . . disability movement is a great mortuary for the ethics of 
hard work, individual responsibility, and pursuit of excellence, and also 
genuinely for human social order ...." 
... [B]y "seiz[ing] on the existence of some real disabilities and 
conjur[ing] up other alleged disabilities in order to promote a particular 
vision of human society," the learning disabilities movement cripples 
allegedly disabled · students who could overcome their academic 
difficulties ''with concentrated effort," demoralizes non-disabled 
students who recognize hoaxes performed by their peers, and "wreak[ s] 
educational havoc" .... The policies that have grown out of learning 
disabilities ideology leach our sense ofhumanity."190 
185. See, e.g., John Elvin, ADAs Good Intentions Have Unintended Consequences, 
INSIGHT ON NEWS, Feb. 21,2000, at 18, 18-19. 
186. Colker, Windfall, supra note 73, at 99. 
187. Jd (quoting Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25 
1997, at 16 [sic], 18). 
188. See MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM Go AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER 
REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 22-75 (2003). 
189. See Crossley, supra note 21, at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
190. Guckenbergerv. Boston Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106, 118 (D. Mass. 1997). 
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The media coverage of the ADA provides numerous examples of 
cynical attitudes about the scope of the statute and the honesty ofthose 
seeking its protections. For example, the washington Times< James 
Brovard offered this exaggerated view of the statute's impact in a 1996 
editorial: 
(The ADA] has turned disabilities into prized legal assets, something to 
be cultivated and flourished [sic] in court rooms to receive financial 
windfalls. The ADA creates a powerful incentive to maximize the 
number of Americans who claim to be disabled, since the claim of 
disability amounts to instant empowerment in the eyes ofthe law.191 
This view is by no means unique or isolated. 192 
Notions of "claiming disability" by malingering or faking 
disability have long-standing roots in American culture. Scholars have 
documented the development of negative attitudes, stereotypes, and 
assumptions about disabled people from the post-Civil War era 
through to the present and have noted a striking consistency in such 
attitudes. 193 Professor Peter Blanck concluded from his historical 
191. James Bovard, Editorial; Disability Intentions Aslnly, WASH. TIMES, May 20, 
1996, at Al6, quoted in Peter Blanck, Civil War Pensions and Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 
109,210 (2001). 
192. Other examples of this reaction compiled by Professor Blanck, supra note 191, at 
205 n.323, include: Trevor Armbrister, A Good Law Gone Bad, READER'S DIG., May 1998, 
at 145, 149 (claiming that a flood of frivolous ADA lawsuits has clogged the courts); 
Editorial, The Horrors of the ADA, N.Y. PoST, May 1, 1999, at 16 (quoting Senator 
Armstrong's view of the ADA as "'a legislative Rorschach test, whose meaning and 
significance will be determined by years of costly litigation"'); Editorial, Laws Protecting 
Disabled Too Susceptible to Abuse, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 9, 1999, at 1 OA ("History may 
record the Americans with Disabilities Act as one of the most costly and abused pieces of 
legislation Congress ever brought forth."); Dan K. Thomasson, Op-Ed, Bureaucracy: 
Creating Disabilities "Where None Existed, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 30, 1999, at 19A 
("[T]he [ADA] at times seems more like a prescription for absurdity than an effort to redress 
injustices for those less fortunate."). 
Professor Blanck, supra note 191, at 203 n.309, 217 n.379, 217 n.378, 210 n.349, also 
cites WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY 134 (1997) ("Few laws have done as much as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act to make a note from your doctor something you can take to 
the bank."); Shalit, supra note 187, at 16; Michelle Stevens, High Court Must Define 
Disability, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 2, 1999, at 35A (stating that "[a]ll manner of malingerers 
have jumped onto the ADA bandwagon," and that the ADA protects "shameless shirkers"); 
Editorial, Cleaning Up the Mess, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Jan. 12, 1999, at 6B (arguing that the 
ADA has generated more litigation than predicted, mostly by persons with questionable 
disabilities). Parenthetical explanations for the previous citations were also provided by. 
Professor Blanck, supra note 191. 
193. See Blanck, supra note 191, at 210 (observing that criticism of the ADA as 
"foster[ing] frivolous litigation" is "[r]eminiscent of President Cleveland's 1887 veto message 
warning of the 'race after [Civil War] pensions' as placing 'a premium on dishonesty and 
mendacity"'); see also Peter David Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disability Civil 
Rights: Civil War Pensions and the Politics ofDisab1?ity in Amenca, 52 ALA. L. REv. 1, 2 
. ·'" ·~· .',~··· . '. ,, .... 
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research of depictions of people with disabilities: "One hundred years 
ago, and today ... disabled people are portrayed by some as shirkers, 
malingerers, and free-loaders." 194 His findings illustrate. that 
"historically, as in contemporary society, negative and stereotypical 
views, either purposefully or unknowingly, contribute to conceptions 
of disabled persons as 'illegitimate,' 'malingering,' and 'unworthy' ... 
despite evidence to the contrary." 195 
Thus,. it appears that the "malingerer problem"196-that is, the 
prospect of the existence of some individuals who may falsely claim to 
be disabled for secondary gain-has long colored the entire category 
of "the disabled" as a group of individuals with automatically suspect 
credibility. 197 Accordingly, it is not surprising that society would 
(2000) (stating that courts' resistance to the concepts of civil rights and antidiscrimination 
central to the ADA may be due to the history of American disability policy); Peter Blanck & 
Chen Song, "Never Forget Ulhat They Did Here':· Civil War Pensions for Gettysburg Union 
Anny V§terans and Disability in Nineteenth-Century America, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
1109, 1139 (2003) [hereinafter Blanck & Song 'Wever Forget Ulhat They Did Here'] (stating 
that Gettysburg veterans with certain disabilities were considered to be Jess deserving of 
pensions); Peter Blanck & Chen Song, Civil War; fension Attomeys and Disability Politics, 
35 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 137, 138 (2002) (discussing the change in the view of disabled 
people in American society following the Civil War); Peter Blanck & Chen Song, "YWth 
Malice Toward None; YWth Charity TowardAll':· Civil War Pensions for Native and Foreign­
Bam Union Anny V§temns, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2001) (stating that 
the Civil War forever changed medical and public conceptions of disabled people in 
America); Larry M. Logue & Peter Blanck, "There Is Nothing that Promotes Longevity Like 
a Pension':· Disability Policy and Mortality ofCivil War Union Anny V§terans, 39 WAKE 
FOREST L. REv. 49, 67 (2004) (discussing how lessons learned from the past help modern 
American society deal with misconceptions about disability). 
Paula Berg has observed that the suspicion of those asserting a disability also derives 
from the "deeply held American value of personal sovereignty, and the concomitant belief 
that any type of personal misfortune, even the most crippling congenital impairment, can and 
must be overcome by individual will." Berg, supra note 46, at 32-33. 
194. Blanck, supra note 191, at 217. 
195. Blanck & Song, 'WeverForget Ulhat They Did Here,"supra note 193, at 1167. 
196. See Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impainnents Under the Amencans with 
Disabilities Act· A Search forihe Meaning of"Disability'; 73 WASH. L. REv. 575, 600 n.82 
(1998) ("[T]he ADA creates a unique set of incentives for rational individuals to malinger, 
which makes the malingerer problem important for the ADA to address."). 
197. See Blanck & Song, 'Wever Forget Ulhat They Did Here'; supra note 193, at 
1167. We see here some overlap with the suspicious regard of the "narcissistic" disabled 
plaintiff, as described by Lennard J. Davis. Lennard J. Davis, Bending Over Backwards: 
Disability; Narcissism, and the Law, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING 
DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 98, 102. Drawing on a number of contemporary and 
historical sources, he notes that many regard the attitude of people with disabilities as 
follows: "[D]isabled people claim that Nature has done them a wrong, and for this wrong 
they seek reparation. This reparation is really an attempt to claim themselves as an exception 
to the rules of society, which allows them to overstep the bounds assigned to normal people." 
Id at 101. Davis observes from his analysis ofreasonable accommodation cases that such 
view "carr[ies] over into the judicial realm." Id at 102. 
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embrace a tool that holds promise· to :minimize such occurrence, 
perhaps saving everyone much time and expense. Society identified 
medicine as that tool and assigned a central role to physicians in 
pronouncing who is (or is not) truly disabled, thet:eby presumably 
weeding out any potential malingers in the disability determination 
process. The cases requiring expert medical evidence in some or all 
claims of disability both reflect and are a direct result of this notion 
and suspicion. 
An explicit demonstration of such attitude is· found in a district 
court case, Farley v. Gibson Container, Jnc., 198 that is frequently cited as 
authority by other courts. 199 There, the United States District Court for 
the Northern District ofMississippi granted the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on a claim brought by an employee who asserted 
that he was disabled based upon complications from hernia surgery, 
including pain, dizziness, bleeding, and nausea.200 While the court 
acknowledged that there was no dispute that the surgery occurred 
(indeed, the surgery was required for a work-related injury and the 
. employee was out of work for six weeks following the surgery), and 
the plaintiff had offered evidence of limitations resulting from the 
surgery, the court concluded: "[The plaintiff] has presented absolutely 
no medical reports or other objective evidence substantiating his claim 
that his injury and subsequent surgery left him with a condition which 
rises to the level of a physical impairment. This court, as have others, 
finds this omission significant."201 
Thus, the court concluded, the plaintiff failed to establish that he 
was a person with a disability. 202 The court's rationale for requiring 
such objective evidence was as follows: 
To hold otherwise would render the requirement of a physical 
impairment superfluous and meaningless and would allow anyone with 
any kind of condition, regardless of the severity, to claim a physical 
. impairment. Employers should not be expected to recognize a physical 
. impairment solely on an employee's "say-so," as Farley expects Gibson 
198. 891 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. Miss. 1995). 
199. See, e.g., Kalekiristos v. CTS Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 958 F. Supp 641, 657 (D.D.C. 
1997) (quoting Farley in concluding that the plaintiffhad presented no evidence of substantial 
limitation). 
200. Farley, 891 F. Supp. at 324, 326. 
201. Jd at 326. The plaintiff alleged that in the months following the surgery, his 
surgical scar repeatedly opened when he engaged in heavy lifting at work, resulting in the 
described pain, bleeding, nausea, and dizziness, causing him to leave work early each time 
this occurred. Jd at 324. 
202. Jd at 326-27. 
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to do. The logical consequences of such blind acceptance are simply 
too obvious to state. 203 
Of course, tllis rejection of "blind acceptance" of the "say-so" of 
those who "claim a physical impairment" is directly contrary to the 
requirement established by the Supreme Court under the Celotex 
trilogy.204 Courts must apply all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party in a summary judgment motion and accept the 
nonmovants' version of facts as true, provided that it is supported by 
any admissible evidence, with no weighing of evidence or 
determinations of credibility by the court.205 However, time and again, 
courts deciding summary judgment motions on ADA claims fail to 
heed tllls requirement. 
B. 	 Roots ofthe Problem in the Development ofFederal Benefits 
Programs 
The question of "disability" that federal judges encounter most 
often, and have for decades, is in the context of appeals of disability 
determinations in the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. 206 The political 
scientist Deborah A. Stone traces the historical roots of the central 
placement of medical expertise in disability determinations for public 
entitlement programs in her book, The Disabled State. 207 Although her 
focus is on disability determinations for government-based benefits 
programs, such as SSDI and SSI, and she wrote before the enactment 
203. Id at 326. Although the court couches the requirement for documentation as 
something that the employer was entitled to, the rationale was in fact addressing whether the 
court must "recognize a physical impairment solely on an employee's 'say-so,"' as there was 
no issue in the case regarding a failure to provide medical documentation to the employer­
defendant. Id Thus, it appears that the reference to the "employer" was perhaps intended to 
suggest that a defendant should not be expected to concede the issue of disability in litigation 
absent medical evidence of such disability. 
204. 	 See supm notes 153-158 and accompanying text. 
205. Se~ e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-58 (1970); lOA 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2727, at 459, 462 (19~8) 
("Because the burden is on the movant, the evidence presented to the court always is 
construed in favor of the party opposing the motion and the opponent is given the benefit of 
all favorable inferences that can be drawn from it. . . . [F]acts asserted by the party opposing 
the motion, if supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, are regarded as true." 
(emphasis added)). 
206. According to recent Social Security Administration statistics, approximately 
13,000 appeals were filed in federal court from October 2005 to September 2006. Social 
Security Online, Hearings and Appeals: Federal Court Review Process, http://www.ssa.gov/ 
appeals/court_process.htrnl (last visited Sept. 13, 2007). 
207. See generally STONE, supra note 42, at 90-117 (discussing how disability benefits 
programs came to rely on medical evidence). 
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of the ADA, her conclusions help answer the question of why courts, 
especially federal courts, place central importance on corroborating 
medical evidence for meeting the definition of disability under the 
ADA. 
Stone notes that the association between "disability" and 
"deception" has its origins at least as far back as the English Poor 
Laws and the control of "beggars" in local communities.208 Thus, she 
concludes, "[T]he very category of disability was developed ·to 
incorporate a mechanism for distinguishing the genuine from the 
artificial."209 But it was also the result of a political debate regarding 
who was an appropriate recipient of public aid and accordingly 
excused from the workplace economy. 210 
208. Id at 32. 
209. Id People with disabilities are by no means the only category of people who 
have been subjected to skepticism and scrutiny ip. connection with participation in 
"entitlement" programs, broadly defined. So-called "welfare queens," immigrants, and other 
social groups identified with entitlement programs have and continue to be the objects of 
public disdain, distrust, and urban myths regarding those allegedly "working the system." See 
generally ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM? WELFARE POLICY IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 7-17 (1998) (describing prevalent myths and negative opinions 
associated with "welfare" in various forms); THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S 
MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 82-83 (1990) 
(discussing standard beliefs about welfare in American society). Indeed, it is this historical 
association with such groups that has led to deep-seated suspicion of those claiming disability 
that persists to this day and threatens to restrict the expansion of their civil rights. 
Recent studies by evolutionary psychologists suggest that in the course of our evolution 
as social beings benefiting from communal norms of"reciprocal altruism," humans may have 
developed specific "cheater-detection" abilities and strong dispositions to punish what are 
perceived as violations of such norms among members of a community. See, e.g., Dan 
Sperber & Vittorio Girotto, Does The Selection Task Detect Cheater-Detection?, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (J. Fitners & K. Sterelny eds., forthcoming), 
available athttp://www.dan.sperber.com/cheatet'lo20detection.pdf; see also Leda Cosmides & 
John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE ADAPTED MIND: 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 180-206 (Jerome Barkow et 
a!. eds., 1992) (arguing that people's minds have reasoning procedures that detect cheaters in 
a social context). 
210. See Matthew Diller, Entidement and Exclusion: The Role ofDisability in the 
Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REv. 361, 363 (1996) [hereinafter Diller, Entidement 
and Exclusion]. Professor Diller notes that: 
Public benefit, programs use the concept of disability to create an economic and 
moral boundary that separates those who are required to work from those whose 
participation in the labor force is excused. Despite its appearance of medical 
objectivity, disability is a socially constructed status that can be defined in any 
number of ways. Definitions of disability both reflect and reinforce a series of 
normative values about the nature and extent ofthe social obligation to work. 
Id; accord Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REv. 
1003, 1069 (1998) [hereinafter Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies] (noting that suspicion of 
"malingering" has been a source of public animosity towards disability benefits programs); 
... -~---.-----
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The 1948 Advisory Council charged with determining a design 
of the SSDI program recommended to the Senate that '"compensable 
disabilities be restricted to those which can be objectively detennined 
by medical examination or tests. . . . The danger ofmalingering which 
might be involved in connection with such claims would thereby be 
avoided."'211 Physicians initially resisted being placed in the role of 
determining disability, although there were various distinct bases for 
this resistance. 212 The "overwhelming majority" of physicians offering 
testimony before Congress on the proposed program asserted that 
"physicians could not possibly provide the kind of objective 
determination desired by program advocates."213 These physicians 
made three "technical" objections to the role proposed for physicians 
in the new program: (1) that disability determination is an "inherently 
subjective" process, and "honest physicians could legitimately disagree 
about whether a person is disabled"; (2) that labeling a person as 
"disabled" could be "therapeutically harmful," by impeding the 
recovery and rehabilitation process, and possibly encouraging 
malingering; and (3) the process of certifying disability would place 
physicians in an "uncomfortable, if not conflictual, role."214 
Nonetheless, notions of "medical objectivity" were incorporated in 
subsequent amendments to the Social ·Security Act; indeed, it was 
"faith in the techniques of medical examination and the powers · of 
clinical judgment" that encouraged many legislators to support 
expansions ofthe disability insurance programs.215 
Stone argues that courts applying the Social Security Act 
reinforced the "myth of objective clinical determination," and she cites 
Sharon L. Harlan & Pamela M. Robert, The Social Construction of Disability in 
Organizations, 25 WoRK & OCCUPATIONS 397, 402 (1998) (noting the historical trend for the 
state to use physicians to certify the legitimacy' of disabilities "[t]o separate those who have 
authentic impairments from those who might take undeserved advantage of public aid for the 
purpose of avoiding work"). 
211. STONE, supm note 42, at 79 (quoting S. REP. No. 80-162, at 6 (1948)) (emphasis 
added by Stone). 
212. Id at 80. 
213. Id 
214. Id at 80-81. Other objections raised by physicians pertained to feared effects on 
the medical profession and the delivery of health care. Id at 80, 88. 
215. Id at 83, 86. Economist Edward Yelin has examined the SSDI program and its 
impact (or lack thereof) on withdrawal from the workforce. He·concludes that the occurrence 
of true malingering is significantly exaggerated, and that the c;ry of widespread false claims is 
a "'myth,"' which has been '"used [by politicians] to legitimate cutbacks in disability 
benefits."' Blanck & Song, "Never Forget Mat They Did Here'; supm note 193, at 1167 
(quoting Edward Yelin, The Myth ofMalingen'ng: My Jnmviduals Withdraw JTom Y!0rk in 
the Presence oflllness, 64 MILBANK Q. 622, 647 (1986)). 
50 TULANELAWREVIEW [Vol. 82:1 
the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Mathews v. Eldridge by way of 
example: "The medical assessment of the worker's condition [in an 
SSDI determination] implicates a more sharply focused and easily 
documented decision than the typical determination of welfare 
entitlem.ent. The decision whether to discontinue disability benefits 
will normally turn upon routine, standard, and unbiased medical 
reports by physician specialists."216 Stone also notes that focus upon 
"impairment" is not the only mechanism used to determine 
disability.217 For example, in some epidemiological studies of 
disability, the classification is based entirely upon the individuals' 
statements of limitations in activities.218 Thus, "a medical conception 
of disability is not the only possible conception."219 It is, however, the· 
approach generally followed when a person rriay claim disability for 
some secondary benefit, where the specter of the "malingerer 
problem" looms. 220 
The requirement of medical corroboration 'in ADA cases may 
also stem from some courts' view that the ADA is not a civil rights 
statute aimed at eliminating discrimination and barriers but nothing 
more than another form ofa "special rights" or "entitlements" program 
for people with disabilities, similar to SSDI and SSI. The regulations 
and case law (over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction) for 
these two disability benefits programs make it clear that the presence 
of a "medically detenninable physical or mental impairment"221 is the 
predominant factor in assessing "disability,"222 that medical evidence is 
216. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1976) (internal quotations marks 
oniitted). 
217. STONE, sup.ro note 42, at 108-109. · 
218. Seeidat109. 
219. Id Indeed,. as James I. Charlton notes in his cross-cultural examination of 
disability, NonnNG ABoUT Us WITHOUT Us (1998), many non-Western cultures have strictly 
religious or spiritual conceptions of disability and that a clergyperson, not a healer, is given a 
central role in "determinations" of disability. Id at 62-65. 
220. Cf. Rudolph L. Rose, Insurance F.roud and Worke.m' Compensation, in 
INSURANCE LAW 2005: UNDERSTANDING THE ABC's 473, 484 (John C. Yang ed., 2005) 
("[T]rue malingerers carefully manage to avoid medical contacts which might unmask 
them."). 
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). See generally Frank S. 
Bloch, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and Social Security's Medically Centered Definition of 
Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 189, 192 (2007) (examining the difficulty in implementing 
the ADA's definition of disability and the role that medical expertise plays in the "disability 
determination process"). 
222. See Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion, sup.ro note 210, at 390-92. 
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required in order to est.ablish eligibility, and that the presence of 
disability is the central question.223 
The ADA, however, is plainly not an entitlement program. Its 
scope and objectives are markedly different from those of the disability 
benefits programs and reflect an important advancement in notions of 
the respective roles ofpeople with disabilities and the society in which 
they live and work224 When federal courts fail (consciously or 
unconsciously) to note the distinctions between notions of disability in 
the ADA as opposed to those developed under entitlement programs, 
this leads to continued reliance on the same notions of disability 
reflected in the SSDI and SSI programs.225 
223. See, e.g., 20 C.P.R. § 416.908 (2007) (requiring SSI applicants to demonstrate 
that claimed "physical or mental impairment(s) ... results from anatomical, physiological, or 
psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and 
laboratory diagnostic techniques" and requiring that such impairment "be established by 
medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by [an 
individual's] statement ofsymptoms" (emphasis added)). 
Professor Crossley has observed that the SSDI program "illustrates the medical model 
ofdisability in action," because: 
[S]ociety allocates to physicians the authority to validate the existence of disability 
and thus to provide an individual with access to whatever social assistance may be 
available to disabled persons. It is up to a physician to diagnose or categorize the 
cause of an impairment and to measure and document its functional impact. The 
individual's own subjective experience of impairment or limitation is irrelevant 
unless it can be professionally validated. · 
Crossley, sup.mnote 21, at 650-51. 
224. See Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 210, at 1019-32; see also 
Patricia Illingworth &Wendy E. Parmet, Positively Disabled· The Relationship Between the 
Definition of Disability and Rights Under the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 3, 11 (Leslie 
Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) ("[T]he ADA draws upon the traditions ofboth 
civil rights laws as well as disability entitlement programs to create a complex, 'second­
generation' statute that aims to achieve the negative liberty of self-sufficiency while fostering 
the positive right to accommodation."); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and 
Accommodation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 642, 643 (2001) (stating that commentators contrast Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the ADA, arguing that the former is a true 
antidiscrimination law while the latter is·a mere accommodation law); Michael Asl:iley Stein, 
Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Acc,ommodations As Antidiscrimination, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 579, 583 (2004) (''ADA-mandated accommodations are an essential normative 
device for effectuating equalitY on behalf of people with disabilities."). 
225. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, 1J1e Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare 
Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 921, 927 (2003) (arguing that the "basic premise" 
underlying the enactment of the ADA was that it would "reduce the cost of dependency of 
people with disabilities" and that such a "welfare reform" approach is a fundamentally 
inadequate "guide to disability employment policy"). Thus, to the degree that the ADA is 
linked with public benefits programs, even as a means to "resolve" the problem of 
dependency, it is not surprising that such connection blurs the distinction between notions of 
disability in the otherwise distinct benefits and civil rights contexts. 
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During the first ten years after the ADA's enactment, federal 
courts struggled with how to handle cases brought by individuals who 
had applied for SSDI or SSI benefits (i.e., claiming that their disability 
rendered them unable to engage in any "substantial gainful activity") 
but also brought actions under the ADA claiming to be qualified 
individuals with a disability. 226 Several courts applied the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel to such claims and entered summary judgment for the 
defendants.227 Scholars criticized this approach and noted the myriad 
significant distinctions between notions of "disability" under each 
statute.228 The issue was eventually addressed in 1999 by the Supreme 
Court in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., which 
rejected the per se application of judicial estoppel to such claims, 
holding that benefits applicants who brought claims under the ADA 
are entitled to explain the apparent self-contradictory assertions. 229 
However, the conflation of notions of disability under benefits 
programs (where such claims must always be validated by medical 
evidence) and civil rights statutes .remains and limits the ADA's use as 
a tool for advancing civil rights for people with disabilities. 230 
C Courts' Misplaced Reliance on Physicians 
Judges (and policymakers) appear to take physicians' opinions of 
disability as descriptions of definitive and irrefutable fact. The ADA's 
226. See Diller, Dissonan,tDisabilityPolicies, supra note 210, at 1014, 1033. 
227. Jd; see, e.g., Feldman v. Am. Mem'l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783, 789, 792 (7th 
Cir. 1999); Taylorv. Food World, Inc., 133 F.3d 1419, 1422-23 (11th Cir. 1998); Lorde v. City 
of Philadelphia, No. CN.A.98-5267, 2000 WL 1763673, at *1, *4 (B.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2000); 
Dayoub v. Penn-Dell Directory Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 636,638,643 (B.D. Pa. 2000). 
228. See Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 210, at 1055-59. Professor 
Diller also noted that: 
The ADA is premised on the recognition that barriers to full participation in society 
are socially created, rather than the inevitable consequence of medical 
impairments.... 
The disability benefit programs are grounded on the premise that inability to 
work is a consequence of medical impairments, rather than barriers created by \ 
Isocial institutions. 
1Id at 1005-06. .1 
. 229. 526 u.s. 795, 807 (1999). ,, ~ 
230. One can see the same skepticism in federal courts when applying other disability­ lj
related statutes. For example, several courts have held that in order to demonstrate a "serious lhealth condition" to trigger the application of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) a 
plaintiff must present medical evidence. See, e.g., Dowell v. Ind. Heart Physicians, Inc., No. l : 
1:03-CV-01410-DFH-TA, 2004 WL 3059788, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 2004) (holding that ~ 
an FMLA plaintiff "must offer evidence from a treating health care provider that her ~ 
pregnancy and related depression qualified as a serious health condition"). ' 
i 
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developing case law reflects, in one scholar's words, "the modernist 
faith in medical science and the dominance of the medical profession 
within society."231 But while physicians unquestionably have much 
expertise, this does not necessarily extend either to detecting 
malingerers or to understanding the impact of a specific in1pairment 
on a specific individual in a specific setting, whether work or 
otherwise. As noted above, doctors at nne time resisted being foisted 
into the role of determining disability,232 rather than simply medical 
impairment.233 The reasons for such resistance provide a· further basis 
to question the role they have been assigned. 
The medical profession as a whole does not claim to be 
especially skilled at detecting malingering. 234 Indeed, the current 
medical literature suggests precisely the opposite: physicians cannot 
detect malingering to a reliable degree. 235 Two researchers conducted a 
recent meta-analysis of the literature on malingering in the medical­
legal context and concluded that physicians have no place making 
determinations of malingering in legal cases. 236 They · note that 
231. Berg, supm note 46, at 20. 
232. See STONE, supm note 42, at 80-83 (recounting the testimony offered by 
physicians in opposition to the impairment-based approach to disability proposed for the 
enactment of SSDI program and specifically denying iliat physicians were capable of making 
objective medical determinations of disability). Stone also states that "[t]he [medical] 
profession steadfastly maintains that 'inability to work' itself is not quantifiable, at least by 
doctors." Id at 113. 
233. See George E. Ehrlich & Fredrick Wolfe, On the Difficulties ofDisability and its 
Detennination, 22 RHEUMATIC DISEASE CLINICS N. AM. 613, 616 (1996) ("The physician's 
important task is to aid his patient in, becoming what the patient wishes; but in the disability 
adjudication process the physician's best role is to stay away from determining disability, that 
interaction between function and society, and only to determine functional ability."); Erin 
O'Fallon & Steven Hillson, Physician Discomfort and Variability in Disability Assessments, 
20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MEn. 852, 853 (2005) (reporting results of study that lists completing a 
"disability assessment" to be the task that gives physicians most discomfort, ahead of 
assessing domestic abuse and having end-of-life discussions with patients, and also noting 
great variability in the results ofsuch disability assessments among physicians). 
234. See Mark Thimineur et a!., Malingering and Symptom Magnification: A Case 
Report Illustrating the Limitations ofClinical Judgment, 64 CoNN. MEn. 399, 400 (2000) 
("There are currently no reliable methods to identify the malingering chronic pain patient and 
no peer reviewed literature on symptom magnification."). 
235. See, e.g., id at 399-401 (describing a case in which several physicians assumed a 
patient with a workers' compensation claim to be malingering, when a lesion was later found 
to be the source of her complaints); Kenneth D. Craig & Melanie A. Badali, Introduction to 
the Special Senes on Pain Deception and Malingering, 20 CLINICAL J. PAIN 377, 378-80 
(2004); David A. Fishbain et a!., Is There a Relationship Between Nonorganic Physical 
Findings (Waddell Signs) and Secondazy Gain/Malingering?, 20 CLINICAL J. PAIN 399 (2004); 
Mark Sullivan, Exaggemted Pain Behavior: By What Standard? 20 CLINICAL J. PAIN 433 
(2004). 
236. See George Mendelson & Danuta Mendelson, Malingering Pain in the 
Medicolegal Context, 20 CLINICAL J. PAIN 423 (2004). 
54 
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physicians are often forced into this role: "Regrettably, in many ... 

cases, judges virtually invite the expert witness to usurp the fact­

finding role of the court and to offer evidence about issues that 

properly belong to the· court, including whether or not the plaintiff is 

truthful or lying."237 Even where such invitation is not "express," this is 

nonetheless the effect when courts require plaintiffs to offer expert 

medical evidence as part of their claim. Lawyers too "may attempt to 

seduce the expert witness to express an opinion that is beyond the 

legitimate limits of his or her professional expertise, either attesting to 

the veracity of the lawyer's client or labeling the opponent's client as a 

malingerer."238 

A pair of physicians writing on this subject observed: "[T]he. 

features associated with disability are not those for which the physician 

is either the primary source of information or the best judge."239 They 

note that a physician's assessment of a patient may be distorted in the 

legal contexe4° For example, if a physician notes on a chart that a 

patient is '"better,' it may mean that he is coping better, marshaling 

resources better, or is happier, but not necessarily that he is functioning 

any better."241 However, such statement would be no doubt damaging 

to the patient's ability to establish disability. Similarly, some 

physicians may feel that attaching a label of "disabled" to a patient is 

disadvantageous to their patients; many physicians hold the "general 

professional belief in the value of communicating a sense of hope to 

the patient; a determination of disability is thought to deprive the 

patient ofbelief in recovery and therefore of a will to recover."242 

The parameters set by courts regarding the role of medical 
evidence often reflect a lack of understanding of how physicians 
approach assessment ·of patients. For example, some courts that 
require medical evidence to prove disability in ADA claims further 
insist that any medical evidence be limited to a physician's 
"independent" assessment of the nature of the impairment and the 
extent of any limitations, unpolluted by the statements and claims of 
· the plaintiff-patient. Thus, in some instances, the medical evidence 
offered in support of a claim of disability is disregarded where it is not 
237. Id at428. 
238. Id at 431. 
239. Ehrlich & Wolfe, sup.ronote 233, at 619. 
240. Seeid at 620. 
241. Id The authors, in fact, go so far as to suggest that doctors should withhold 

progress notes when they are sought in legal cases, "since in sharing them we may violate our 

responsibility to our patients." Id 

242. STONE, sup.ronote 42, at 151. 
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sufficiently "objective." For example, in Baerga v. Hospital for Special 
Surgery, the court commented that the evidence ·in a psychological 
report was less than persuasive because it merely "relies on Plaintiff's 
self-reporting and conclusory allegations."243 In Kn'skovic v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that he was denied a promotion due to 
a disabling foot injury, which restricted his physical activities, 
including his ability to walk. 244 The court entered summary judgment 
for the defendant on the plaintiff's claims, holding that he had failed to 
produce evidence that he was substantially limited in the major life 
activities of standing and wa1king.245 The court dismissed the 
deposition testimony of the plaintiff's physician as being probative on 
that issue because it was couched in "imprecise, subjective terms," that 
"no objective tests" were performed to determine the plaintiff's ability 
to walk, and that :the doctor's estimates of the plaintiff's limitations 
were based "only on his familiarity with [the plaintiff's] type of injury 
and [the plaintiff's] comments to him."246 Thus, his opinions were ''too 
uninformed and speculative to create a triable issue [of fact] ."247 These 
cases overlook the fact that subjective complaints are a significant 
basis of evaluation and diagnosis in medicine, especially in the areas of 
chronic pain conditions such as fibromyalgia, and mental illness, 
yielding no less valid diagnoses in the eyes of the medical 
profession.248 
Historically, medicine. was not always associated with objective 
assessments.249 The concept of objective determinations of medical 
conditions accompanied developments in medical technology, starting 
with the invention of the stethoscope in 1819, and, most significantly, 
with the X-ray machine.250 Much of the motivation to develop such 
243. No. 97 Civ.0230(DAB), 2003 WL 22251294, at *5 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003). 
244. 948 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (B.D. Wise. 1996). 
245. Id at 1363-64. · 
246. Id at 1364. 
247. Id 
248. See STONE, supra note '42, at 109 ("In epidemiological studies of disability 
conducted by governmental agencies, interviews are generally used (rather than medical 
examination), and the classification of people as disabled is made on the basis of whether 
they saythey have limitations on: their normal activities."). 
249. Jd at 104-06; see also MILOS JENICEK, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE-BASED 
MEDICINE 5-7 (2003) ("In Ancient Greece and throughout history, physicians were often 
outstanding philosophers first and only later became biologists."); J. ROSSER MATTHEWS, 
QUANTIFICATION AND THE QUEST FOR MEDICAL CERTAINTY 4 (1995) (examining the debate in 
nineteenth-century .Europe regarding the use of statistical analysis in medicine and noting the 
criticisms of physicians of such use on the basis that medicine was an "art" rather than a 
"science"). 
250. See STONE, supra note 42, at 104-06. 
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technologies was to separate the patient from the diagnostic process, 
and with it, the possibility for exaggeration or feigning of symptoms.251 
The purported deficiencies in the expert opinions raised in the 
decisions discussed immediately above, such as an absence of 
laboratory findings or exclusive reliance upon a patient's report of 
symptoms, are classic fodder for cross-examination of treating or 
evaluating physicians at trial. Imposing a requirement of introducing 
objective evidence, however, guarantees that a plaintiff who does not 
(and in the case of certain conditions, cannot) produce this type of 
evidence will never present her case to a jury. Courts can and should 
leave the ultimate decision on the sufficiency and weight of medical 
evidence, whatever its content or basis, to the fact finder. 252 
Assigning physicians a central role in validating disability claims 
is also based upon an assumption that physicians themselves have a 
solid grasp on their patients' experiences. However, several studies 
point to physicians' inability to ·accurately judge patients' subjective 
complaints, especially pain. 253 Such studies conclude that physicians, 
especially ones who have been practicing for several years, routinely 
rate pain as being far milder than their patients' oWn. assessments of 
their pain.254 One medical commentator has observed: "[T]here is 
widespread underassessment and underestimation of pain, badly 
deserving correction. This undoubtedly is fed by reservations about 
the credibility of self-report expressed not only by scientists, but also 
251. Seeid 
252. In dictum in an unreported per curiam decision, the Seventh Circuit correctly 
notes that the evaluation of subjective complaints of pain is a credibility issue and therefore 
inappropriate for summary judgment. Beasley v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., No. 95-3477, 1996 WL 
102546, at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). The court's brief but careful discussion of the issue 
stands in stark contrast to its later decisions, and those of the district courts applying such 
decisions, regarding the need for corroborating evidence of disability. See, e.g., McPhaul v. 
Bd. of Comm'rs, 226 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2000) (''All that [the plaintiff] can present in 
support of her reasonable accommodation claim is her own self-serVing testimony, and in this 
case, that is just not sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that she is a qualified individual 
with a disability under the ADA."). Likely because it was unpublished, the Beasley decision 
has never been cited by another court. 
253. See John T. Chibnall et al., The Effects ofMedical Evkience and Pain Intensity 
on Medical Student Judgments of Chrome Pain Patients, 20 J. BEHAV. MED. 257, 266-68 
(1997). 
254. See, e.g., id at 258 (explaining how studies show that as patient pain levels 
increase, observers progressively discount the pain); John· T. Chibnall et al., h1temist 
Judgments ofChronk Low Back Pain, 1 PAIN MEo. 231, 236 (2000); Laetitia Marquie et al., 
Pain Rating by Patients and Physicians: Evklence ofSystematic Pain Miscalibration, 102 
PAIN 289, 289-94 (2003); Maida J. Sewitch et al., Measuring Differences Between Patients' 
and Physicians' Health Perceptions: The Patient-Physician Discordance Scale, 26 J. BEHAV. 
MED. 245, 260 (2003). . 
J 
i 
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by the public at large."255 As literature scholar Elaine Scarry stated 
succinctly: "[T]o have great pain is to have certainty; to hear that 
another person has pain is to have doubt."256 
For these reasons, an argument can be made that physicians are 
frequently not competent, in the evidence rules' application of the 
word, to offer testimony about an individual's disability. 257 Since the 
- ADA and the Supreme Court require an individualized review of 
disability, including the specific limitations experienced by the 
individual, then the most (and in many cases, only) relevant evidence 
should be a description of the plaintiff's daily life and the barriers 
(literal and figurative) that she encounters.258 Since few physicians are 
fully aware of the barriers encountered by and the daily experiences of 
their patients (because such matters are often not seen as relevant to 
the diagnosis and treatment of diseases and conditions); testimony by 
physicians may offer little to aid the fact finder's understanding of the 
plaintiff's disability.259 In contrast, it.is plaintiffs who can provide the 
mostreliable evidence of disability. 
As seen above, societal preoccupation with malingering and the 
role of physicians' opinions in determining disability developed 
together from the earliest examples of legal remedies and public 
benefits extended to people on the basis of medical conditions. They 
are now nearly inextricably tied and account at least in part for the 
courts' straying from the mandates of summary judgment procedure in 
ADA claims . 
. VI. EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS AND QUESTIONS 
Although both the stated and · unstated rationales of courts' 
insistence upon expert medical evidence to establish disability are 
misplaced, there are some additiomil issues that warrant consideration. 
Many of these questions broaden the discussion beyond the issue of 
disability discrimination and the ADA's parameters to considerations 
255. Craig & Badali, supmnote 235, at 379 (footnotes omitted). 
256. ELAINE SCARRY, THEBODYINPAIN 7 (1985). 
257. See FED. R. EVID. 602, 703. 
258. See Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[A] 
plaintiff's testimony may suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact."); Haynes v. 
Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that the plaintiff's personal testimony 
about his ability to sleep created a genuine issue offact). 
259. Cf.Wolz v. Deaton-Kennerly Co., No. 98 C 6610,2001 \VL 699096, at *6 n.6 
(N.D. Ill. June 20, 2001) (observing, in an ADA claim brought by a plaintiff with 
fibromyalgia, that the plaintiff's physician stated at her deposition that she is as a general 
matter '"very anti-disability for fibromyalgia patients."'). 
-~------------------ ··- ·-··-- -- ·------------­
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of evidence law generally, including the role of expert medical 
testimony in contemporary trials and the extent to which the Federal 
Rules of Evidence allow an ADA plaintiff to establish the fact of her 
disability solely through her own testimony. The resolution of these 
questions further underscores courts' errors in concluding that expert 
medical evidence is an indispensable requirement for establishing 
disability under the ADA. 
A. 	 The Evolving Role ofthe Medical Expert and the Prima Facie 

Case · 

The ADA is not the only context in which some courts require a 
party to introduce expert testimony to establish a prima facie case. In 
certain other settings, courts require a party to offer expert testimony, 
including expert medical evidence, to establish a particular fact "where 
more than common knowledge and experience. are needed to 
understand the issues and to form an opinion."260 Stated another way, 
expert testimony is not required where "'the subject of inquiry is one 
which is plainly comprehensible by the jury and of such a nature that 
unskilled persons would. be capable of forming correct conclusions 
respecting it without the opinion of experts."'261 
This rule is a contemporary manifestation of the evolving notions 
of the respective roles of the jury and the expert witness.262 At one 
time, the pretrial controversy was almost exclusively over whether to 
permit the introduction of expert testimony.263 Courts viewed such 
"experts" with suspicion, as overeducated ·hired guns who would 
confuse the jury or who would usurp the role of the jury or judge.264 
· Thus, under the common law rule, such testimony was admissible only 
where a necessity for such evidence had been demonstrated.265 A 
nineteenth-century opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
demonstrates this caution well.266 In Pulsifer v. Berry, one of the issues 
on appeal was whether the trial court had properly permitted the · 
testimony of a railroad engineer regarding the care that should have 
260. 	 Estate ofSewart v. Taff, 602 N.E.2d 1277, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
261. Baker v. Mid Me. Med. Ctr., 499 A.2d 464, 469 (Me. 1985) (quoting Ginn v. 
Penobscot Co., 334 A.2d 874, 883 (Me. 1975)). 
262. 	 See KAYEET AL., supmnote 176, §§ 1.2-1.2.2, at 5-7. 
263. Jd § 1.2.1, at 6-7 (noting that at common law, experts were limited to testifying 
about issues that were sufficiently outside ofthe knowledge ofthe jury). 
264. 	 Jd § 1.2, at 5-6. 
265. 	 Jd § 1.2.1, at6-7. 
266. 	 Pulsifer v. Berry, 32 A. 986 (Me. 1895). 
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been taken to prevent the spread of a_ fire. 267 The court held that the 
testimony should have been excluded and noted: 
It is an elementary rule respecting the introduction of oral evidence that, 
in general, witnesses are only permitted to state facts within their 
lmowledge, and not to give their opinions or conclusions. The testimony 
of experts constitutes one of the exceptions to this rule. . . . But the 
opinions of experts are not deemed admissible where the subject of the 
inquiry is one of general observation or experience, and not such as 
require any peculiar habits or study in order to qualify a man to 
understand it. . . . The jurors may have less skill and experience than 
the witnesses, and yet have enough to draw their own conclusions, and 
do justice between the parties. Where the facts can be placed before a 
jury, and they are of such a nature that jurors generally are just as 
competent to form opinions in reference to them, and draw inferences 
from them, as witnesses, then there is no occasion to resort to expert or 
opinion evidence. . . . . With respect to all matters which may be 
presumed to be within the common experience of all men of common 
education, moving in the ordinary walks of life, it is deemed safer to 
take the judgment of unskilled jurors than the opinion of biased 
experts.268 
Many of these notions regarding the limitation on expert opinion 
evidence were eventually codified in courts' rules of evidence, 
including those applied to the federal courts.269 However, during the 
second half of the twentieth century, courts moved away from notions 
of necessity and towards analyses of whether such evidence would be 
"helpful" to the jury.270 VVhat is remarkable is that in some 
jurisdictions, the standard for whether expert testimony was admissible 
has been transformed, in some cases, into the standard for whether 
such testimony is required 271 Thus, as a general rule, "if a party seeks 
to prove an issue that is beyond the ken of the jury, that party must 
present expert testimony."272 Although the language mirrors the 
common law approach to the admissibility of expert testimony, this 
requirement is not an evidentiary rule at all but, rather, a requisite of 
the substantive law underlying a plaintiff's claim for relief Thus, the 
267. Id at 987-88. 
268. Id (citations and internal quotations marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
269. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 602,703. 
270. SeeKAYEETAL., supmnote 176, § 1.2.2, at7-9. 
271. See, e.g., Bakerv. Mid. Me. Med. Ctr., 499A.2d464, 469 (Me. 1985) (addressing 
the necessity of expert testimony, quoting Ginn v. Penobscot Co., 334 A.2d 874 (Me. 1975), 
an appeal regarding the exclusion of expert testimony). 
272. KAYEET AL., supmnote 176, § 1.6, at 38. 
', 
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absence of such testimony necessarily results in the failure to establish 
each ofthe elements of such claim. 
To a certain degree, the Katz-Marinelli line of cases reflects the 
notion that there are certain · medical conditions-those that are 
"obvious"-regarding which a jury need not receive medical 
testimony to evaluate and consider. But for certain other claimed 
impairments, these courts hold, a physician's opinion is an 
indispensable prerequisite to establishing disability. Under this 
approach, conditions calling for expert testimony include: a heart 
condition,273 deep vein thrombosis,274 fibromyalgia,275 a learning 
disorder,276 anxiety disorders,277 and agoraphobia.278 Although the 
courts in the Second Circuit follow a sine qua non rule of medical 
evidence, the district court in Sussle v. Sirina Protection Systems 
C01p., which sets forth the most detailed analysis of the issue,. 
specifically noted that the claimed disability at issue in that case, 
Hepatitis C, would not be understood by the jury.279 By comparison, 
those conditions found to be sufficiently "obvious" and therefore not 
requiring expert testimony include: arm and neck pain,280 back and 
abdominal pain,281 and hearing loss.282 
Thus, these ADA cases demonstrate how, in modem case law, the 
relevant inquiry for allowing the admission of expert evidence has 
morphed into a nearly identical inquiry for whether such testimony is 
required as a matter of substantive law. However, as discussed above, 
there .is no basis in the text or regulations of the ADA to conclude that 
expert testimony is required to establish a prima facie claim of 
disability.283 
This conclusion is reaffirmed by examining and contrasting 
contexts other than the ADA definition of disability in which courts 
273. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996). 
274. Lakota v. Sonoco Prods. Co., No. Civ.A.00-30219-FHF, 2002 WL 596211, at *3­
4 (D. Mass. Apr. 4, 2002). 
275. Brandon v. Klingensmith Healthcare, Inc., No. Civ.A.03-1963, 2005 WL 
3434£41, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005). • 
276. Dorn v. Potter, 191 F. Supp. 2d 612, 623 (W,D. Pa. 2002). 
277. Ashton v. AT & T Corp., No. Civ.A.03~CV3158(DMC), 2005 WL 2320899, at *5 
(D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2005). 
278. ld 
279. 269 E Supp. 2d 285,303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
280. Marinelli v. City ofErie, 216 F.3d 354, 361 (3d Cir. 2000). 
281. Dicino v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, No. Civ.Ol-3206(JBS), 2003 WL 21501818, at 
*7 (D.N.J. June 23, 2003). 
282. Gourleyv. Home Depot, No. Civ.A.99-5728, 2001 WL 755102, at *3 & n.6 (E.D. 
Pa . .June 29, 2001). 
283. Seesupranotes 132-173 and accompanying text. 
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require a plaintiff to offer expert m~dical evidence to support not 
simply a given fact, but a prima facie case. One such context is 
medical malpractice litigation, where a common law rule (codified by 
84
some states Y evolved requiring the use of expert medical testimony to 
establish a prima facie case. 285 There, the requirement is not based on 
the use of a physician's testimony to disclose, explain, or validate the 
plaintiff's own experience, but to provide competent evidence of one 
of the elements of claim.286 Only a physician (with the appropriate 
training and experience) can testify to the standard of professional 
medical care ·in a given contexe87 The same requirement applies 
equally in other professional malpractice cases: expert testimony by a 
member of the profession must be presented (or an expert on the 
profession must testify) as to the profession's standards of care. 288 
Thus, in these contexts, the focus of the expert testimony is, to a great 
extent, on the defendant's actions or inaction, rather than the plaintiff's 
condition. Indeed, in some medical malpractice cases, where the 
breach-of-duty issue to be determined in a case is one within the 
common lmowledge of jurors, such as the failure to remove a foreign 
object or instrument (e.g., "the overlooked sponge") used in surgery or 
a failure to provide informed consent, no ·such testimony is required; 
courts rule that a jury is competent to determine the standard of care 
without the aid of a medical expert.289 
Another example of the potential need for medical evidence in a 
tort claim is where a plaintiff is alleging a complex causation fact, such 
as the effect of exposure to certain toxins, the development of cancer, 
284. See, e.g., Haase v. Starnes, 915 S.W2d 675, 678 (Ark. 1996) (interpreting a 
codification but noting that expert evidence is not always required). 
285. Estate of Sewart v. Taff, 602 N.E.2d 1277, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (noting that 
expert medical testimony is needed "to establish the benchmark standard of care because 
jurors are unskilled in the practice of medicine and would be unable without medical 
evidence to determine any lack of necessary scientific skill"). 
286. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 176, § 1.6, at 38. Some courts have in fact clarified 
that expert medical testimony is required only in medical malpractice cases in which the 
standard of care is at issue; in other types of malpractice cases, such as breach of express 
warranty, such testimony is not needed. Haase, 915 S.W.2d at 677-79. 
287. See 32 C.J.S. Evidence§ 637, at 512 (1996). 
288. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 176, § 1.6, at 38 ("Thus, except in cases of res ipsa 
loquitur, expert testimony is required to prove that a professional failed to meet his 
profession's standard ofcare."). 
289. One author notes that courts began carving out exceptions to the requirement of 
medical evidence because plaintiffs encountered such difficulty finding physicians who were 
willing to testify for a medical malpractice plaintiff. David E. Seidelson, Medical 
Malpractice Cases and the ReluctantExpert, 16 CATH. U. L. REv. 158, 159-60 (1966). 
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or other illnesses.290 In the absence of such evidence, jurors would be 
asked to engage in pure speculation about the existence of a causal link 
between an exposure and an illness. Thus, while there are at least 
some contexts in which courts appropriately require expert medical 
testimony before submitting a case to a jury, in no cont~xt is the 
medical evidence required to provide corroboration of a plaintiff's 
claims. 
Moreover, if we broaden the question to the requirement of 
medical evidence in personal injury cases generally, such as to prove 
the harm to the plaintiff, courts have little basis to preclude a plaintiff 
from going to trial without an expert. There are few reported cases in 
which a plaintiff's failure to provide expert testimony on the issue of 
injuries resulting froin a defendant's negligence was the sole basis to 
preclude her from going to trial.291 There can be little question that the 
testimony of a well-qualified expert to explain the nature and extent of 
a plaintiff's injury enhances a plaintiff's credibility and therefore the 
likelihood of her recovery, but this is an issue distinct from whether 
such testimony is necessary to established the elements of a plaintiff's 
claim. Indeed, one of the central tactics of defending a personal injury 
claim is to expose exaggerated levels of injury· through the use of 
discovery tools or cross-examination. A plaintiff who proceeds to trial 
without some medical evidence to support her claims of harm does so 
at her own peril, but, of course, courts allow imperiled claims to go to 
trial all the time. 
Another context in which courts debate the requirement of 
medical documentation of disability is banlauptcy adversary 
proceedings in which a debtor seeks a discharge of an educational 
loan, which are categorically excluded from dischargeable debts 
290. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 176, § 1.6, at 38; see also Jones v. Ortho Pharm. 
Corp., 209 Cal. Rptr. 456, 461 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Although juries are normally permitted to 
decide issues of causation without guidance from experts, the unlmown and mysterious 
etiology of cancer is beyond the experience of laymen and can only be explained through 
expert testimony." (internal quotations marks omitted)). 
291. Historically, one exception has been in the case of emotional distress torts where 
there needed to be an expert medical witness to testify as to the objective physical 
manifestations of emotional distress. It is now well-settled, however, that a plaintiff need not 
present expert testimony to establish such distress or harm. Such emotional distress may be 
demonstrated solely through a plaintiff's own testimony, including in employment 
discrimination claims, although a plaintiff is generally permitted to offer corroborating 
testimony. See Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir. 1996); Bolden v. Se. 
Pa. Transp. Auth., 21 F.3d 29, 34 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994); Zerilli v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 973 F. 
Supp. 311, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, Nos. 97-7921, 97-9219, 1998 WL 
642465 (2d Cir.Apr. 6, 1988). 
-----
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otherwise, on the basis of "undue hardship."292 Several courts have 
recognized that a disability that limits one's ability to work may 
constitute such hardship, but are not in agreement regarding the 
evidentiary burden on debtor-plaintiffs in such cases.293 In many ways, 
the arguments there are similar to and parallel with those in ADA 
cases. 
294 The discussion, however, is focused more on the overall 
burden of a plaintiff to prevail on such ~laims (in which the court sits 
as fact finder) rather than to establish a prima facie case for purposes 
of surviving summary judgmene95 The undue hardship exception 
imposes a demanding burden on debtors seeking discharge. If one is 
claiming hardship from a medical condition, she must establish that it 
will prevent her from maintaining a standard of living "for a 
significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans."296 
Courts require debtors to present "[ s ]ubstantial credible evidence ... to 
support the existence of such a medical condition," more than ''bare 
allegations."297 Even under this standard, however, few courts require 
the presentation of expert medical testirnony.298 The general trend in 
these cases is to permit a debtor to demonstrate that a medical 
condition limits her ability to repay the loan through judicial notice, 
documentation of eligibility for certain public benefits programs such 
as SSDI, or the production of medical records, to corroborate the 
debtor's own testimony.299 And some courts simply conclude that the 
292. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007). 
293. See In reNash, 446 F.3d 188, 192-93 (1st Cir. 2006) (ruling that a mental illness 
could be an undue hardship, but the plaintiff needs to provide reliable evidence of the long­
term prognosis and effect of the illness); In re Shilling, 333 B.R. 716, 722-23 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 2005) (holding that a judge's detemiination that a debtor temporarily "met the disability 
requirements of the Social Security Act" was not sufficient evidence of a permanent or 
prolonged hardship). 
294. Compare Baerga v. Hosp. for Special Surgery, No. 97 Civ.0230(DAB), 2003 WL 
22251294, at *4 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 30, 2003) (stating that one can be substantially limited in 
tne area of working if his disability precludes him from doing more than one type of job), 
with Nash, 446 F. 3d at 192-94 (stating that the plaintiff failed to show that she was entitled to 
undue hardship discharge of her student loan debt because she did not show that her mental 
illness would prevent her from working in the future). 
295. See Nash, 446 F.3d at 194 (holding that a bankruptcy judge did not err in finding 
that a plaintiff did not satisfY her burden of proof where she failed to provide evidence of a 
future period ofunemployability due to her mental illness). 
296. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
297. In re Mosley, 330 B.R. 832, 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
298. See id at 842-43. 
299. Jd at 843-45. 
----~----~~---~---- --·-----­-----~----
----·-----------------­
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debtor's testimony is sufficiently detailed and credible to support a 
discharge.300 • 
Thus, judges evaluating ADA claims appear to be alone in 
requiring expert medical testimony to corroborate a plaintiff's 
assertions of a medical condition to establish a prima facie case. 
Courts have not articulated a reason why ADA claims should receive 
such additional scrutiny. In both ADA and tort claims, a plaintiff must . 
disclose and discuss the details ofthe impact of an impairment on her 
daily life.301 Certainly, there are important differences between offering 
evidence to quantify and explicate the specific harm resulting from a 
tortious act so that a fact finder may attach a numeric value to such 
harm and establishing that one belongs to a class of individuals which 
is disadvantaged by a combination of personal physical characteristics 
and a physical environment structured by society in such a way as to 
render one disabled. But such differences do not support imposing an 
additionalburden on ADA plaintiffs. Indeed, one could argue that the 
opposite should be the case because an ADA plaintiff is not asking that 
a monetary value be placed on her medical condition.302 
B. EVJdentiazyLimitations on aLayperson 3' Testimony ofDisability 
A companion question to whether expert medical testimony is 
required in ADA, tort, or other cases is whether such evidence is 
required, even as a purely practical matter, because testimony 
regarding certain elements of a claim cani:zotbe offered by the plaintiff 
herself. In other words, can a plaintiff describe to a jury her medical 
condition and the resulting impairments without running afoul of 
evidentiary ljmitations on such testimony? If the answer is "no," it 
suggests that medical evidence would be needed to prove the existence 
ofthe disability. 
There are two closely related evidentiary rules that may be 
implicated with testimony of one's. disability. First, a witness is limited 
300. Id at 846-47. 
301. Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr. Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 765 (lOth Cir. 2006) 
("To establish a valid claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must . . . . (1) have a recognized 
impainnent, (2) identify one or more appropriate major life activities, and (3) show the 
impairment substantially limits one or more ofthose activities."). 
302. While the ultimate outcome of an ADA claim may well involve some cost to the 
defendant and gain by the plaintiff, such costs and gains are not calculated as part of the 
disability determination stage of the claim, but, rather, are based upon findings of whether 
there was disparate treatment, denial ofa reasonable accommodation, or some other violation 
of the statute. See Douglas M. Staudmeister, Comment, Grasping the Intangible: A Guide to 
Assessing Nonpecuniary Damages in the EEOC Administrative Process, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 
189,203-05 (1996) . 
.. 
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to testifying to facts within her personal lmowledge.303 . This 
requirement restricts testimony to those facts that can be perceived and 
were in fact directly perceived by the witness.304 A second distinct rule 
is that against the admission ofhearsay statements, or assertions of fact 
told to the witness out-of-court.305 Thus, if a witness testifies to a fact 
as told to her by another, this is hearsay, which is generally 
inadmissible unless a particular exception applies.306 If she testifies to 
a fact for which no foundation for her lmowledge has been established 
(and, indeed, the context indicates that she could be aware of such fact 
only as a result ofbeing the recipient of a hearsay statement rather than 
perceiving such fact for herself), such evidence should be excluded 
because of a lack ofpersonallmowledge, not because her only basis of 
lmowledge is likely to be hearsay, although practitioners and courts 
frequently confuse the two rules. 307 
However, it is not always apparent what facts are based solely 
upon a witness's personallmowledge. Indeed, as some commentators 
have observed: "The personal lmowledge requirement does not 
demand lmowledge in an absolute or literal sense."308 Indeed, a witness 
cannot testify as to what she has perceived without relating it, 
consciously or unconsciously, to her own past experience and existing 
foundation oflmowledge and understanding.309 As the modem editors 
of McConnick on Evidence observed: "When the witness ... bases 
his testimony partly upon firsthand lmowledge and partly upon the 
account of others, the problem calls for practical compromise."310 
Specifically, such testimony should be admitted (or excluded) based 
upon the court's determination of the overall reliability of the 
303. FED.R.EVID. 602. 
304. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 247, at424-25 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) 
(examining the difference between the hearsay rule and the rule requiring firsthand 
knowledge). 
305. Id § 248, at 425. 
306. See, e.g., FED.R.EVID. 801(d). 
307. See McCORMICK, supra note 304, § 247, at 424 ("The distinction is one of the 
form of the testimony, whether the witness purports to give the facts directly upon his or her 
own credit (though it may appear later that the statement was made on the faith of reports 
from others) or whether the witness purports to give an account of what another has said and 
this is offered to establish the truth ofthe other's report."). 
308. 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE§ 6023, at 221 (2007). 
309. Id § 6023, at 228 & n.22 (citing discussion of "knowledge structures" in 
RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF 
SOCIALJUDGMENT28-42 (1980)). 
310. McCORMICK, supra note 304, § 10, at23. 
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evidence. 311 The oft-cited example of such lmowledge is an. 
individual's age or date of birth.312 Since no person recalls the actual 

events surrounding one's own birth, one is necessarily relying upon, to 

some degree, reports from others regarding the date of that evene13 

The same is true regarding kinship (how can you know someone is 

your brother, aunt, grandfather, etc. but from what others have told 

. you?), and, a:s with a witness's age, courts generally permit testimony 

of such facts.314 · 
How do·ithese evidentiary principles apply when a witness offers 
testimony regarding a medical condition? The general rule stated by 
courts in reported opinions has been essentially unchanged for years. 
A plaintiff may testify as to her "general condition" and describe 
symptoms and their impact on her daily life, but she may not testify as 
to her medical diagnoses and prognosis. 315 
In practice, the line between what a plaintiff can testify to and 
what is reserved for the province of medical expertise is unsettled. 
Some courts may permit use of a diagnostic term by a plaintiff in her 
testimony, but most will rule that anything "medical" beyond the 
diagnosis itself is necessarily outside the expertise of the plaintiff or is 
311. Id;,~~e also WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 308, § 6026, at 254-57. 
312. Se~/e.g., Antelope v. United States, 185 F.2d 174, 175 (lOth Cir. 1950) (holding 
that the alleg~d.~ictirn of statutory rape could testify as to her age); McCORMICK, supra note 
304, § 10, at43;WruGHT &GOLD, supra note 308, at§ 6026, at255. 
313. seeAntelope,185F.2dat175. 
314. This practice is reflected in Federal Ru1e of Evidence 804(b)(4), which created a 
limited hearsay exception for statements regarding family history. 
315. See, e.g., Robinson v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 1005, 1010 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1982) ("While it would have been proper for plaintiff to describe any symptoms or physical 
limitations which she did not experience prior to the incident [at issue in the litigation], as 
well as testify to how she felt, it was improper -for her to testifY concerning special medical 
conditions such as high blood pressure and angina. Plaintiff was not qualified as an expert 
and was therefore incompetent to testifY regarding specific medical diagnoses." (citations 
omitted)); Morphew v. Morphew, 419 N.E.2d. 770, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) ("[A] lay 
witness may testify about his or her illness. However, '[w]ith regard to diagnosis, causes and 
effects of disease ... opinions of lay or nonexpert witnesses are not competent evidence."'), 
superseded by statute on othergrounds, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 
§ 423(a), 98 Stat. 494, 799; 32 C.J.S. Evjdence § 551 (1996) ("While a nonexpert or lay 
witness may not give expert testimony as to his physical condition, he may state simple 
inferences drawn from his conscious subjective sensations concerning such condition .... 
According to some authority, a witness should be confined to testimony or statements 
relating to the outward appearance of his injuries and to the symptoms experienced by him, 
such as pain, suffering, and the like, and should not be permitted to testify as to the nature of 
his injuries, the applicable medical terminology, and the like, and the medical prognosis or 
treatment. . . . According to some cases, a witness may not testifY as to whether or not he had 
a particular disease or was treated for a particular disease."). 
' 
i 
I 
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based upon out-of-court statements made by a treating physician.316 
There is little question that a person can descnbe subjective 
experiences of pain and other symptoms or that he or she is in a state 
of general good health.317 One may also testify as to what actions may 
lead (based upon reasonable inference) to an exacerbation of 
symptoms ("My back hurts when I lift my infant daughter" or "My 
medication makes me sleepy").318 Courts generally permit one to 
testify as to the impact of a medical condition on one's ability to 
perform work or other tasks as compared with the time before the 
onset ofthe condition. 319 
316. See, e.g., Marcus v. Lindsey, 592 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Ala. 1992) (noting prior 
case law holding that a plaintiff may generally testify as to the fact and symptoms of a 
fractured bone, but cannot testify as to other medical effects of the injury.jtself); Howard v. 
Feld, 298 N.W.2d 722, 723 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a plaintiffi:liay testify as to an 
injury, as long as there are no disputed issues beyond a layperson's lmowledge, such as scope 
and cause of injury). · 
317. See, e.g., Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331,337 (7th Cir. 1998) ("A witness does 
not need to be a doctor to discuss his or her health in general terms."); Graves v. Graves, 531 
So. 2d 817, 822 (Miss. 1988) (noting that a plaintiff in a personal injury action is permitted 
"to testify as to his own pain and suffering and to describe his physical injuries"). 
318. See, e.g., Guyer v. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah, 292 S.E.2d 445,448 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a plaintiff could testify as to her "observations of the effect on 
her work" of her injury); McMahon v. Richard Gorazd, bic., 481 N.E.2d 787, 796 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff may testify as to symptoms experienced after taking certain 
medications). 
319. See, e.g., Sheffield Co. v. Phillips, 24 S.E.2d 834, 839 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943) ("The 
court did not err in permitting the plaintiff to answer the following question: 'Tell the jury 
whether or not you are as able physically to do the duties that you have to do now as you were 
before you were hurt by this elevator?' The extent of the plaintiff's injuries and his disability 
physically were for the jury, and it was not improper to allow the plaintiff to answer the 
question."). Furthermore, the court in Carter v. Bradford, 126 S.E.2d 158, 160 (N.C. 1962), 
noted: 
The testimony to which objection was made involved her statement that from the 
date ofher injury to the date of her testimony she had lost 90 per cent of the use of 
her right hand. The defendant insists this evidence involves the expression of 
opinion which plaintiff is not qualified to give and that the objection should have 
been sustained on that ground. However, a lay witness may express opinion about 
his present state of health, ability to do work, etc. "The ability of a party to 
perform physical or mental labor is not a question of such exclusively technical 
significance as to permit expert testin1ony to be given conclusive .effect." The 
plaintiff, a typist and bookkeeper, was in a better position than any other person to 
know what she had done with her right hand prior to the injury and what she was 
able to do with it afterwards. The testimony does not attempt to project the 
disability or to anticipate its future effect. She was merely testifying as to how the · 
injury had handicapped her to the date of the testimony. Its admission was not 
error. 
ld (citations omitted). The court in Roberts T{ Motor Cargo, Inc., 104 N.W.2d 546, 550 
(Minn. 1960) noted: 
_J 
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To the extent that a pla:intiff is deemed to be offering an opinion 
of her own condition, her testimony must fall within the requirements 
of "Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses" in Federal Rule ofEvidence 
701: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in 
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or 
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the 
witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding ofthe witness' testimony or 
the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 
702.320 
More specifically then, the question can be phrased as whether a 
pla:intiff's opinipn about her own condition is "rationally based" upon 
her own perception of the condition rather than upon "scientific, 
technical, or other specialized lmowledge." 
The reported opinions :indicate that few courts permit one to · 
testify that she has a particular disease or condition, or the permanency 
of a condition.321 It would seem, however, that a diagnosis or condition 
is the sort of fact, noted by the McConnick on Evidence editors, that a 
pla:intiff would offer based upon both reports of others (specifically, 
her health care provider's diagnosis, for example, of a"spastic colon") 
and her own perception of the condition (her experience of frequent 
and painful bowel movenients).322 Thus, courts should not exclude 
such testimony out of hand, but, as is done with the fact of a person's 
age, should consider the overall reliability of such evidence given the 
circumstances :in which it is offered, perhaps :in light of facts 
appropriate for judicial notice.323 Indeed, :in practice, courts and 
Generally, an injured person may testify with regard to the results he has 
experienced from his injury, his symptoms, pain he has suffered, the effect of his 
injury on his physical condition and on his ability to do work or certain kinds of 
work. For instance, a witness has been permitted to testify that as a result of his 
•injury he had no use ofhis foot; that the injury he suffered had reduced his ~bility 
to do carpenter work and to what extent; that a stone cutter, an injured layman, 
could testify that if his arm remained the same he would not be able to resume his 
trade. 
Id 
320. FED.R.EVID. 701. 
321. See Barber v. Verizon New England, Inc., No. Civ.A.05-390-ML, .2006 WL 
3524465, at *6 (D.R.I. Dec. 6, 2006) (stating that a plaintiff's testimony regarding a doctor's 
speculative diagnosis is inadmissible). 
322. McCORMICK, supra note 304, § 10, at23. 
323. See Gage v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 365 F. Supp. 2d 919, 929 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) ("While medical evidence may be difficult to understand without the use of an expert 
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opposing counsel will likely raise few barriers to an individual stating 
a diagnosis unless the fact of the diagnosis is truly a central dispute in 
the case. 
In the ADA context, only a few courts have specifically 
aclmowledged the potential evidentiary limitations on a plaintiff's 
ability to testify as to her medical condition in the context of proving 
that she is disabled under the statute. In Cruz Carollo v. AA1R Eagle, 
Jnc.,324 a court noted that the plaintiff was not competent to testify as to 
the impact of HIV infection on his abilitY to reproduce, and his failure 
to produce medical evidence on the issue, in contrast to the plaintiff in 
Bragdon v. Abbott,325 was fatal to his claim.326 In Holt v. Olmsted 
Township Board ofTrustees, the United States District Court for the 
N orthem District ofOhio ruled that the plaintiff could not testify to her 
diagnoses of cytomegalovirus, chronic fatigue syndrome, and 
fibromyalgia, but she could generally describe her "condition."327 
In Mehta v. Council for Jewish Elderly, the United States District 
Court for the N orthem District oflllinois denied a defendant's motion 
to exclude the plaintiff's testimony regarding her medical condition 
(patchy bulbar duodentis).328 The court noted that the plaintiff may 
testify as to her oWn perceptions and opinions ofher medical condition 
and that it was up to the jury whether to credit her testimony.329 This 
approach was followed in the same district several years later in 
Denson v. Northeast Dlinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp., 
which held that a plaintiff may testify as to her own experience of her 
condition (an arm and shoulder injury) but not what her doctors have 
told her.330 
In the ADA context, where issues of ca,usation, prognosis or the 
adequacy of medical treatment play no role, rules regarding the 
opinion, courts have routinely held that lay individuals ·are certainly capable of reliably 
understanding and testifying to their own medical conditions."). 
324. 148 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D.P.R. 2001). 
325. 524 U.S. 624, 630 (1998) (holding that an IDV-positive plaintiff was disabled 
under the ADA even though the "medical" evidence offered consisted ofmedical literature on 
HIV infection rather than evidence specific to the plaintiff herself). 
326. Such a fact may be appropriate for judicial notice, however. See supra notes 120­
126 and accompanying text. 
327. 43 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815,819-20 (N.D. Ohio 1998). 
328. No. 95 C 1156, 1996 WL 272520, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 1996). 
329. ld at *3. 
330. No. 00 C 2984, 2003 WL 1732984, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2003); cf. So. Cal. 
Housing Rights v. Los Feliz Towers HomeownersAss'n, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1069-70 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005) (holding that under the Fair Housing Amendment Act, medical evidence was 
required to prove disability because the plaintiff could only testify as to symptoms and their 
impact on her life, not the actual medical condition). 
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competencY of an individual to testify to her own medical condition 
need not be so strictly applied as in cases in which such issues are in 
dispute. Indeed, as described above with respect to testimony about 
birth and kinship, it is not logical or practical to push the personal 
lmowledge or hearsay rules to an absurd point. There is something 
inherently odd about not permitting a person with cancer to utter the 
words "I have cancer" or likewise for an individual to testify "I have a 
broken leg" or "I have diabetes" if she has such conditions. Of course, 
in the most literal sense, she does not really ''know" she has a tumor, 
and that is something that her physicians could not themselves discern 
. until they ran a scan, X-ray, or blood tests. She can certainly testify 
that she has pain, fatigue, and physician-imposed restrictions on her 
activities, but why should she not state the reason for such pain, 
fatigue, and restrictions? She can testify that she goes to the hospital 
once a week and has an intravenous drip; she should not be precluded 
from testifying that such treatment is "chemotherapy." Similarly,· 
statements such as "They removed a lobe ofmy lung last March" need 
not be excluded. There is unquestionably a point at which a person's 
subjective experience ofher illness becomes melded with her personal 
lmowledge and awareness based upon information·· from reliable 
sources. In other words, does not one gain personal lmowledge of 
one's own body at some point such that one is no longer merely 
parroting the words of a physician? To at least some degree, courts' 
overly technical division of "lmowledge" of medical conditions is a 
further reflection of the role we expect physicians to play in society; 
that to the exclusion of the patients themselves, physicians are the sole 
guardians of the knowledge and understanding of their patients' 
illnesses and physical limitations. 
Moreover, since the regulations and case law dictate an 
individualized case-by-case review of the impact of an alleged 
impairment on the individual, the central facts in an ADA disability 
determination analysis must be the plaintiff's indiVidual experience of 
her disability, particularly as they impact her major life activities. 331 As 
discussed above, no witness can provide more direct and competent 
personal lmowledge of such facts than the plaintiff herself. For this 
reason as well, it seems that courts must take a more reasonable 
approach to the admissibility of such evidence in ADA claims. 332 
331. SeeAlbertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1999). 
332. ·For example, such evidence may be particularly appropriate for admissibility 
under the "residual exception" to the rule against hearsay provided in the Federal Rules of 
I 
i 
l 
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VII. 	CONCLUSION: THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR DISABILITY AS A 
POLITICAL CATEGORY 
This discussion leads us to a final question: Why should we care 
if courts impose a requirement of producing corroborating medical 
evidence to establish that one is disabled under the ADA? The answer 
goes to the fulfillment (or not) of the ADA's mandate to eradicate 
discrimination on the basis of disability. The continued hegemony of 
medicine in notions of disability, with a focus on personal impairment 
and malingering, serves as an impediment to reframing notions of 
disability as urged by disability scholars and activists. A requirement 
of "proof" of disability from a medical provider impedes the class of 
disability from emerging as a truly protected status, approaching that 
of race, gender, religion, and age.333 It serves to perpetuate the central 
role of medicine in notions of disability, preventing a broader, more 
powerful conceptualization ofthe term.334 
The continued association of disability with medicine-and 
therefore with siclmess, tragedy, dependence, and other stigmatizing 
notions of powerlessness and victimhood-undermines the very 
paradigm shift that many advocates sought to bring about with the 
ADA's enactment.335 By making the plaintiff's role as "patient" the 
Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 807 (permitting admissibility of certain evidence that would 
otherwise be hearsay with "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"). 
333. 	 Professor Mary Crossley noted the problem of the courts' requirerpent of medical 
evidence to prove disability in her 1999 article, The DisabilityKaleidoscope, and observed: 
As a political matter, disability studies scholars view the identifying or labeling of 
who is disabled as an exercise ofunequal power, and have argued that the power to 
define who is disabled has historically been used to advance the interests of groups 
providing services to disabled people rather than to advance the interests or well­
being of disabled people themselves. 
Crossley, supra note 21, at 690 (footnotes omitted); accord Berg, supra 46, at 44 ("[T]he 
practice of determining disability on an individualized basis undermines a sustained political 
consciousness among people with disabilities and, in turn, undermines a unified disability 
rights movement."). 
334. Linton has observed: 

When medical definitions of disabilityare dominant, it is logical to separate people 

according to biomedical condition through the use of diagnostic categories and to 

forefront medical perspectives on human variation. When disability is redefmed as 

a social/political category, people with a variety of conditions are identified as 

people with disabilities or disabledpeople, a group bound by common social and 

political experience. 
LINTON, supra note 5, at 12. 
335. See Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 210, at 1059. Professor 
Diller notes that: 
[A] disturbing tendency to adhere to the "medical abnormality" view of disability 

has become apparent in cases· dealing with the ADA. This tendency threatens to 
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preliminary question-before . considering her role as employee, 
patron, or citizen-judges immediately place a plaintiff in a position of 
being pathologized, pitied and therefore disempowered. 336 If a plaintiff 
declines to put forth a construct of herself as "patient," as is the case 
where a plaintiff offers only her own narrative of her disability, she is 
precluded entirely from presenting her account of discrimination to the 
fact finder. 
hnposing a requirement of expert medical testimony that goes 
beyond diagnosis also places many plaintiffs in the position of having 
to disclose information to attorneys, judges, and perhaps the general 
public that is deeply personal, private, and perhaps humiliating in the 
prosecution of her ADA claims.337 No other category of employment 
discrimination forces a plaintiff to do so.338 Thus, the medical evidence 
requirement itself may serve as a powerful deterrent to those seeking 
to vindicate their rights under the ADA. 339 
drain Title I of the ADA of its vitality, rendering its provisions an exercise in the 
rhetoric ofequality, rather than a means ofachieving real social change. 
Id 
336. Professor Laura Rovner provides a thoughtful discussion of the question of 
"whether litigation, a traditional vehicle for enforcing civil rights, may create its own boxes 
and stereotypes" and therefore poses a "risk to persons with disabilities of allowing lawyers 
to conceptualize their stories and define their identities." Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma, supra 
note 28, at 249. For example, a disabled person who is an active, accomplished person may 
not, in her own mind, fit the stereotype of the "helpless cripple." Jd at 282-83. As Professor 
Rovner has observed: "[M]any disability rights advocates have made careful, concerted 
efforts to reject imagery and language that portray disabled people as being pitiable, 
powerless, or victimized by virtue of their disabilities." Jd at 291-92. 
337. See Berg, supra note 46, at 39-41 ("Within the structure of disability 
determinations, the plaintiff's body is an object to be investigated by lawyers, doctors, and 
vocational experts, and ultimately codified by the judge. . . . [P]laintiffs who wish to 
persuade a judge that they are disabled have no choice but to portray their impairment-in all 
its corporeal detail-as the central and defining feature of their identity and daily lives."); see' 
also Sarka v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 ER.D. 127, 130 (B.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that an 
ADA plaintiff claiming disability due to depression had waived the psychotherapist-plaintiff 
privilege, without limitation, and "must therefore authorize the release of all records that 
contain confidential communications with her psychiatrist that are relevant to her mental 
condition during the time she was in Defendant's employ"). 
338. Seesupranotes 165-171 andaccompanyingtext. 
339. An experience from my own practice illustrates the hazards faced by ADA 
plaintiffs. I represented a deaf couple claiming discrimination in public accommodations; 
specifically, a medical practice that refused to provide American Sign Language (ASL) 
interpreters for office visits. The defendants vigorously contested that my clients were 
disabled (despite the fact that they both used ASL and received all of their education at 
schools for the Deaf). Defense attorneys attempted to subpoena medical records, including 
records of their marriage counseling sessions, as well as emergency dispatch tapes in an 
attempt to locate and reveal contexts in which my clients used speech instead of ASL. The 
federal magistrate judge granted my motion for a protective order regarding most of the items 
sought, including the counseling records, and specifically rejected the defendant's arguments 
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Overreliance on medical evidence similarly reinforces false 
notions of the objectivity and certainty of medicine, most importantly 
that of a medical diagnosis. There is no objective basis in science for 
the discrete and judgmental categories of"normal" and "abnormal" as 
distinct :from the statistically more or less nurnerous.340 Moreover, the 
act of diagnosis and classification is not :free :from elements of social 
control, stigma, and politicallabeling.341 An ADA plaintiff therefore is 
compelled to adopt and promote the labels assigned by the medical 
profession (with accompanying connotations of being disordered or 
defective) even where such labels may conflict with her self-identity, 
including her political identity as a citizen entitled to obtain and 
maintain employment and to have full access to public accommoda­
tions and services. 
As I have argued previously, courts' hypertechnical readings of 
the ADA definition of disability preclude· analysis of the larger 
questions posed by the ADA regarding the place of people with 
disabilities in workplaces, public accommodations, and public 
that the plaintiffs had put their entire medical history in play by filing an ADA claim. 
However, because the issue of what evidence is discoverable in ADA cases was not clearly 
defined in the law, the matter had to be briefed and argued before a magistrate. Although my 
clients ultimately prevailed on many of the issues raised in the motion for a protective order, 
the very discussion of these categories of evidence threatened to compromise my clients' 
privacy and dignity. 
As cultural historian Douglas Baynton notes: 
With the focus on plaintiffs' bodies, disabled people are placed in the undignified 
(to say the least) position of having to impress ajudge with the seriousness of their 
impairment. By locating the crux of the issue in the body of the individual rather 
than in discriminatory attitudes and practices, people who have experienced 
discrimination on the basis of a physical, mental or psychological difference from 
the majority can nevertheless be excluded from ADA protection. 
Douglas C. Baynton, Bodies and Their Environments: The Cultural Construction of . 
Disability, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 387, 
393 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000). 
340. Ron Amundson, Biological Normality and the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 224, at I 02, I08-1 09; Lennard J. Davis, Constructing Normalcy: The Bell Curve, 
the Novel, and the Invention of the Disabled Body in the Mneteenth Centwy, in THE 
DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 43, at 9, 13-14. 
341. See, e.g., PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND 
MEDICALIZATION: FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS 28-37 (expanded ed. 1992); THOMAS SZASZ, 
INSANITY: THE IDEA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 17-18 (1987); Mary Crossley, Impairment and 
Embodiment, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR 
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 224, at 111, 120-22; Shelley Tremain, Foucault, 
Govemmentality, and Cnl:ical Disability Theory: An Introduction, in FOUCAULT AND THE 
GOVERNMENT OF DISABILITY, supra note 24, at 1, 4-11. 
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services.342 Rejecting such a reading would not mean that every ADA 
plaintiff would prevail. Indeed, the case law of Title VII and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act reveals that courts have spent 
decades working through the myriad of issues presented by claims of 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, age, and other 
characteristics. But the discussion of the corresponding issues in the 
disability category cannot begin in earnest in ADA cases until courts 
loosen the restrictive grip on the class of individuals entitled to present 
their claims to a fact finder. 
This Article has argued that in view of the current language of the 
ADA, and more generally, contemporary approaches to evidence and 
summary judgment, courts are wrong to grant summary judgment to 
defendants based solely on an absence of corroborating expert medical 
evidence to support a finding of disability. Others elsewhere make 
compelling arguments for revisions to the text of the ADA, such as 
introducing a nonexhaustive list of diseases and conditions which 
would establish disability per se. 343 Such revisions may well address 
other problems with the application of the law and could move notions 
of disability away from medically associated terms such as 
impairment. 
·The question will remain, however, of how one proves that one 
has something "on the list." Other commentators have proposed 
eliminating the requirement of proof of a substantial limitation of a 
major life activity in order to meet the statute's definition of 
disability.344 Under this approach, the focus would be on "barriers in 
that person's environment," rather than requiring "cumb~rsome 
evidentiary showings . . . . [with an emphasis on] irrelevant medical 
details about the impairment in order to state a claim."345 "While such 
an amendment would certainly compel an appropriately refocused 
inquiry in ADA claims, there is unlikely to be sufficient political 
support for the change at this time,346 leaving the questions of proof, 
342. Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness, Employment 
Discrimination, and The Americans with Disabilities Ac~ 17 GEO. MASON. U. Crv. RTS. L.J. 
79, 148-49 (2006). ' 
343. See, e.g., Mark A Rothstein et al., .Using Established Medical Criteria to DeHne 
Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans U;lth DisabilitiesAc~ 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 
282-96 (2002) (proposing to amend the ADA to authorize the EEOC to publish medical 
standards for evaluating the severity of the most common impairments and to establish a 
presumption that individuals who meet such criteria are covered under the statute). 
344. Center & Imparato, supra note 28, at 323. 
345. Id at 324. 
346. Id at 344 ("We recognize that our proposed new formulation may not be easy to 
sell politically."). The proposed ':ADA Restoration Act of 2007;' H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. 
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and, ultimately, fairness, to be resolv.ed through litigation unde.r the 
existing definition of disability.347 However, there is nothing in the 
current definition of disability to prevent courts from permitting 
plaintiffs to establish through their own testimony that they fall within 
the statute's protections by describing the substantial limitations­
imposed by both physiological andsocial sources--on their lives. 
It is important to emphasize that the instant discussion is about 
establishing a prima facie case, what is required to get to a fact finder's 
determination, and not about what is ultimately persuasive for a fact 
finder. The court system is, of course, always and appropriately 
concerned with issues of deception and fakery by litigants for personal 
(or corporate) gain. However, warnings about the specter of "abuse" 
in the disability context fail to recognize that the "system" we worry 
about protecting from liars and manipulators already has a guardian­
the fact finder-and an adversarial process designed to permit parties 
to test the sufficiency of others' allegations.348 · 
This Article is not calling for a legal mandate preventing any 
plaintiff from losing in court as the result of an absence of expert 
medical testimony.349 That is not warranted, practical or appropriate, or 
consistent with the ADA as presently drafted. But courts should not 
dismiss claims before trial on the basis that jurors will not likely find 
(2007), introduced in the United States House of Representatives on July 26, 2007, woulcl, 
among other things, remove the "substantial limitation" requirement from the ADA's 
definition of disability. The prospect of the legislation being enacted in its present form 
cannot be determined at this time. 
347. Other commentators have argued that courts can and should take a significantly 
different approach to determining disability within the existing statutory framework. For 
example, Professor Bagenstos argues that when assessing whether a plaintiff is an individual 
with a disability within the meaning of the ADA, courts should require a plaintiff to establish 
"only that she has an (actual, past, or perceived) impairment to which society's choices are 
likely to attach systematic disadvantage . . . . by illustrating the ways in which society­
through a variety of contingent decisions-stigmatizes and/or attaches systematic 
disadvantage to [her] particular impairment[]." Bagenstos, supra. note 38, at 473, 481. While 
I agree that "such an approach has a strong pedigree in disability rights thought," it may not 
eliminate courts' requirement of medical evidence of the claimed "impairment," perhaps 
coupled with requiring other expert testimony on how the plaintiff's impairment is 
substantially limiting through stigmatization. Jd at 481. 
348. See supra note 209 (regarding findings in evolutionary psychology of "cheater 
detection" mechanisms in human cognitive functioning). 
349. This could occur, for example, if a judge did not require a.ny evidence to 
demonstrate that the plaintiff fell within the statute's protected class or instructed the jury that 
it must find the plaintiff to be disabled. However, it would be appropriate to include a jury 
instruction explaining that the plaintiff is not required to produce medical evidence to succeed 
on her claim to prevent jurors from exercising bias regarding the need for such evidence (such 
as that exemplified in courts and media as described in this Article) and to move away from a 
purely medicalized notion of"disability." 
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the plaintiff to be disabled in the absence of corroborating testimony. 
It is the job of the defendant's attorney at trial to raise the issue of the 
sufficiency and quality of the plaintiff's evidence. It is perfectly valid 
for a defendant's attorney to cross-examine a plaintiff on the extent of a 
plaintiff's limitations. It is also appropriate for a defense attorney to 
argue in closing, as would be true in any kind of case, that the 
plaintiff's testimony should be disbelieved and to point out the dearth 
of other evidence, whether lay observation or expert opinion, to 
support such testimony. A defense attorney may or may not succeed 
with such an approach. A jury may decide that even in the absence of 
other "corroborating" evidence, the plaintiff's own account of her 
limitations is credible and sufficient. Courts, then, must step aside to 
allow fact finders to do their job. 
